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I.

INTRODUCTION

If you inquired among the general public, "What does U.S.
copyright law protect?" many people might start by grumbling
that it overprotects piggish record companies. Calming slightly,
they might next reply that copyright protects authors' rights and
that among those is the right to be recognized as the author of
the work. Indeed, few interests seem as fundamentally intuitive
as that authorship credit should be given where credit is due.'
For example, in prelapsarian, pre-Napster days, the act of
copyright infringement in which a youthful individual most likely
engaged was probably plagiarism: there, lifting another author's
text may have been unlawful, but at least as morally (and
pedagogically) reprehensible was passing it off as the lifter's.'
Giving credit where it is due, moreover, is instinctively
appropriate because it furthers the interests both of authors and
of their public. For the public, the author's name, once known,
alerts readers/viewers/listeners to particular characteristics or
qualities to expect in the work.! For authors, name recognition
1.
See generally, e.g., Stuart P. Green, Plagiarism,Norms, and the Limits of Theft
Law: Some Observations on the Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Intellectual
Property Rights, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 167, 175 (2002) (identifying a social 'attribution norm"
and stating that the relevant community "view[s] attribution as being, or closely akin to
being, a moral obligation, rather like showing respect to one's elders"); Eben Moglen, The
dotCommunist Manifesto, at http://moglen.law.columbia.edu/publications/dcm.pdf (Jan.
22, 2003) (rejecting most of copyright but upholding the protection of the author's
attribution interest).
2.
See, e.g., University Policies, Columbia University, available at http://
www.college.columbia.edu/bulletin/universitypolicies.php (last visited Mar. 6, 2004). The
section titled "Plagiarism and Acknowledgement of Sources" includes the following
statement:
Every year there are instances in which students attempt to submit the
work of other people as their own. Because intellectual integrity is the hallmark
of educational institutions, academic dishonesty is one of the most serious
offenses that a student can commit at Columbia. It is punishable by suspension
or dismissal from the College.
Id.
3.
This consideration resembles the rationale for trademark protection. Cf 4 J.
THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 3:10, at 319 to 3-20 (4th ed. 2003) [hereinafter MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS] (stating that a
'[t]rademark signifies that all goods sold under it are of equal quality," and that they thus
symbolize a consistency of consumer experience with the goods or services).
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enhances sales (at least when the work that previously bore the
author's name has been well received). As one Federal Court
judge aptly put it:
Reputation is critical to a person who follows a vocation
dependent on commissions from a variety of clients. Success
breeds success, but only if the first success is known to
potential clients. To deprive a person of a credit to which he
was justly entitled is to do him a great wrong. Not only does
he lose the general benefit of being associated with a
successful production; he loses the chance of using that
work to sell his abilities.4
Most national copyright laws guarantee the right of
attribution (or "paternity");5 the leading international copyright
treaty, the Berne Convention, requires that Member States
protect other Members' authors' "right to claim authorship."6 Yet,
perhaps to the surprise of many, no such right exists in U.S.
copyright law nor in other U.S. laws.' (The Federal Court judge
just quoted sits on the Australian Federal Court, not on any U.S.
bench.) For a time, it seemed as if the Lanham Federal
Trademarks Act provided partial coverage: by making false and
confusing designations of origin actionable, the Act-many
thought-afforded authors relief against misattributions of
authorship.8 Even so, the trademarks law would only have
4.
Prior v. Sheldon (2000) 48 I.P.R. 301 87.
See, for example, Law No. 92-597 of July 1, 1992, on the Intellectual Property
5.
Code, J.O., July 3, 1992, art. L. 121-1 (Fr.), available at http://www.unesco.org
/culture/copy/copyright/france/pagel.html, which recognizes an author's "right to respect
for his name, his authorship and his work" and is intended to enable the author to be
identified as the author of the work on copies or whenever communicated to the public. In
Spain, the rights of "personal character" under the 1987 Copyright Act include the
author's "right to demand recognition of his authorship of the work." Law No. 22/1987 on
Intellectual Property art. 14(iii) (1987) (Spain), reprinted in 3 COPYRIGHT LAWS AND
TREATIES OF THE WORLD, Spain: Item 1, at 5 (UNESCO Supp. 1998).
6.
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art. 6',
Paris Act, July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne
Convention].
7.
This statement is made with the exception of the very narrowly defined right set
out in the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 § 603, 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(1)(A) (2000),
discussed infra.
See H.R. REP. No. 100-609, at 37 (1988) (stressing that the Director General of
8.
"
WIPO endorsed the view that U.S. law already met the article 6b standard). The Ad Hoc
Working Group on U.S. Adherence to the Berne Convention, a group formed at State
Department behest whose report was submitted to Congress, also concluded that U.S. law
afforded "substantial protection ... for the real equivalent of [the] moral rights [of
attribution and integrity]," particularly by recourse to the Lanham Act. See Final Report
of the Ad Hoc Working Group on U.S. Adherence to the Berne Convention at 35, 39-42,
reprinted in 10 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 513, 547, 551-54 (1986) [hereinafter Final
Report on U.S. Adherence].
In contrast, U.S. patent law requires that the true and original inventor or
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reprimanded giving credit to one to whom credit was not due; it
would not have afforded an affirmative right to claim authorship.
In other words, giving incorrect credit may have been actionable;
giving no credit was not.9
In any event, in June of 2003, the U.S. Supreme Court
interpreted the Lanham Act to deny false attribution claims as to
the origin of a "communicative product" in Dastar Corp. v.
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.1 ° The Court thus drastically
limited invocation of the trademarks law to enforce authors'
interests in being recognized as the creators of their works. In
the wake of Dastar,what recourse do authors have in the U.S. to
claim authorship? In Part II, I will address the Dastardecision to
discern if any residue of attribution rights remains under the
Lanham Act. In Part III, I will consider the extent to which the
Copyright Act does, or might, afford attribution rights. That
inquiry leads to the (despondent) answer that in the United
States neither the copyright nor the trademarks laws establish a
right of attribution generally applicable to all creators of all types
of works of authorship. In Part IV, after examining other
common law countries' recent enactments protecting attribution
rights, I will propose an amendment to the U.S. Copyright Act to
add a federal right of attribution of authorship.

inventors be named in the application for a patent. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 116-117 (2000); 37
C.F.R. §§ 1.45-.48 (2004). Section 102(f) of the Patent Act expressly states that a person
will lose patent rights if "he did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be
patented," and § 101 provides that only "[wihoever invents or discovers... may obtain a
patent therefor." 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102(f); see also, e.g., Univ. of Colo. Found., Inc. v. Am.
Cyanamid Co., 105 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1175 (D. Colo. 2000) ("As patents reward inventors
for disclosing beneficial technology to the public, a person cannot reap the reward of
exclusive rights to an invention without being the true inventor.").
For a recent, comprehensive review of U.S. attribution right caselaw, see
generally Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The Attribution Right in the United States: Caught in
the Crossfire Between Copyright and Section 43(a), 77 WASH. L. REV. 985 (2002)
[hereinafter Kwall, The Attribution Right].
9.
See, e.g., Johnson v. Jones, 149 F.3d 494, 496, 499 (6th Cir. 1998) (claim against
an architect who had substituted his name for another's on architectural plans); Lamothe
v. At. Recording Corp., 847 F.2d 1403, 1405 (9th Cir. 1988) (claim by co-authors against
songwriter who published music under only his name); Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d 602,
603 (9th Cir. 1981) (claim against film company who substituted one actor's name for
another in the film credits). See generally JANE C. GINSBURG, JESSICA LITMAN & MARY L.
KELVIN, TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW 618-42 (3d ed. 2001).
10.
123 S. Ct. 2041, 2047-49 (2003).
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II. (DIS)CLAIMING AUTHORSHIP UNDER THE FEDERAL
TRADEMARKS LAW

In what some might see as an act of contrition for having
upheld copyright term extension in Eldred v. Ashcroft," the
Supreme Court made clear, in DastarCorp. v. Twentieth Century
Fox Film Corp., that a work's entry into the public domain
precludes resort to another federal intellectual property statute,
the Lanham Trademarks Act, to achieve a de facto prolongation
of exclusive copyright-like rights. In so doing, however, the Court
appears to have stricken the Lanham Act from the roll of laws
authors might invoke in support of attribution rights. The facts
of the case had nothing to do with authors, were very
unappealing, and were as follows. In 1949, Twentieth Century
Fox produced a multipart television series, Crusade in Europe,
based on then-General Eisenhower's campaign memoirs. In 1977,
after Fox failed to renew the copyright registration, the work
went into the public domain. In 1995, Dastar released a set of
videos, Campaigns in Europe, substantially copied from Crusade.
Dastar listed itself as the producer of Campaigns, without
reference to Crusade or Fox. Fox sued, claiming that Dastar's
release of the videos under its own name constituted "reverse
passing off' in violation of the Lanham Federal Trademarks Act,
section 43(a). Fox contended that substituting Dastar's name for
Fox's constituted a "false designation of origin," because Fox, the
original producer, was the originator of the Crusade television
series that Campaigns "bodily appropriated." The district court
agreed and awarded Fox double Dastar's profits, thus granting
Fox perhaps a higher damages award than it would have
received for copyright infringement (had Fox's copyright still
been in force). The Ninth Circuit affirmed in an unpublished
opinion. The Supreme Court reversed, 8-0 (Justice Breyer
recused).
The unanimous opinion construed the statute's prohibition
on "us[ing] in commerce" (selling) any "false designation of
origin... which.., is likely to... cause mistake, or to deceive as
to the.., origin.., of his or her goods ... by another person."'2

The Court held that "origin" in the sense of the Lanham Act does
not mean the original creator of a work of authorship from which
copies are made, but rather the source of the particular copies

11. 537 U.S. 186 (2003). The Court granted certiorari in Dastar on January 10,
2003, five days before announcing its decision in Eldred. See Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth
Century Fox Film Corp., 537 U.S. 1099 (2003); Eldred, 537 U.S. 186.
See Lanham Trademark Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1).
12.
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(goods) that are being distributed." Thus, a reverse passing off
claim "would undoubtedly be sustained if [the defendant] had
bought some of [the] Crusade videotapes and merely repackaged
them as its own." 4 But the Court rejected the contention that a
different concept of "origin" should apply to a "communicative
product"-a work of authorship. Arguably, the Court's refusal to
accord authors the status .of "originators" of communicative
works was limited to works whose copyrights had expired, rather
than extending to all communicative works, whatever their
copyright status. The Court referred some ten times to the
copyright-expired status of Fox's television series. The Court's
doubts about the validity of an interpretation of "origin" to mean
"author" seem closely entwined with its concern to maintain the
public domain. For example, the Court objected: "Reading 'origin'
in [the trademarks act] to require attribution of uncopyrighted
materials would pose serious practical problems. Without a
copyrighted work as the basepoint, the word 'origin' has no
discernable limits."' 5
On the other hand, it is not clear why, under the concept of
"origin" the Court attributed to the trademarks act, authors
would qualify as originators of copyright-protected works. If, as
the Court stated, "the phrase ['origin of goods'] refers to the
producer of the tangible goods that are offered for sale, and not to
the author of any idea, concept, or communication embodied in
those goods,"' 6 what enables the phrase nonetheless to refer to
the author of a still-copyrighted work? Whether or not the work
is under copyright, its author remains the same person. The
distinction between authors as originators of copyrighted works
and nonoriginators of the same works when the works fall out of
copyright may seem strained. Dastar therefore prompts the
concern-reinforced by lower court decisions interpreting
Dastar-thatthe Supreme Court may have disqualified authors
from pleading the trademarks act's prohibition on false
designation of origin to support a claim to attribution of
authorship status."
13.
Dastar,123 S. Ct. at 2047-48.
14.
Id. at 2046.
15.
Id. at 2049.
16.
Id. at 2050.
17.
Federal district court decisions subsequent to Dastarhave declined to limit that
decision's impact to copyright-expired works. See, e.g., Carroll v. Kahn, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d
1357, 1361-62 (N.D.N.Y. 2003) (quoting Dastar and Williams v. UMG Recordings, Inc. to
support dismissal of a "failure to attribute" claim); Williams v. UMG Recordings, Inc., 281
F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1185 (C.D. Cal. 2003) ("[Tlhe Supreme Court's holding did not depend
on whether the works were copyrighted or not.... Rather .... the Court noted that
protection for communicative products was available through copyright claims."); see also
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Accordingly, it is important to assess the likely impact of the
Dastar decision on the protection of attribution rights in stillcopyrighted works. (The Berne Convention does not require
protection of moral rights in works whose copyrights have
expired. 8 ) In addition, one should consider whether other
portions of the trademarks act may be successfully invoked to
vindicate interests that formerly might have been redressed by
claims against "false designation of origin."
To preserve authors' claims under the Lanham Act, one
might stress the facts of the Dastar case. Whatever the broader
implications of the Court's language, the case itself concerned a
copyright-expired work. In a common law system, a decision's
authority is bound to what the Court actually decided. As a
result, neither the Supreme Court nor lower courts would be
precluded from fresh consideration of the application of the
Lanham Act's protection of "designation of origin" in the context
of an author who asserts that another person was improperly
credited as the author of her still-copyrighted work. Thus, even
though the Court's articulation of its reading of "origin" may not
readily yield a distinction between the origin of works still under
and no longer under copyright, the facts of the case would
support, albeit not compel, that distinction. I acknowledge,
however, that lower courts have so far declined to limit Dastar's
reach to copyright-expired works. 9
Despite this so-far unflinching application of Dastarto stillcopyrighted works, one should recognize that the rationale
behind the Supreme Court's rejection of attribution rights in
copyright-expired works does not extend to copyright-protected
works. The Court placed great emphasis on the unconstrained
ability of the public to copy and distribute public domain works.
Requiring accurate attribution of creative origin, according to the
Court, improperly impedes the public's entitlement. Where, by
contrast, the work is still subject to the author's exclusive right to
make the work available in copies or by transmission, the
requirements as to how the copies or transmissions are labeled
take nothing from the public.
Even where the work is in the public domain, however, the
Court might have recognized that an obligation to credit correctly
the author of a copyright-expired work addresses a different
Bretford Mfg., Inc. v. Smith Sys. Mfg. Co., 286 F. Supp. 2d 969, 972 (N.D. Ill. 2003)
(holding that Dastar was not limited to "communicative products" and that it barred a
reverse passing off claim regarding origin of a component of a table because the "goods"
are the table, not its various components).
18.
See Berne Convention, supra note 6, art. 6'"(2).
19.
Refer to note 17 supra.
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concern, one at trademark law's core-accuracy in market
information. Advancing this goal need not impede the free use of
the work's content. It is not apparent how the public interest in
access to public domain works is furthered by permitting a
purveyor to sell those works under another author's name. For
example, an anonymous seventeenth-century Elizabethan or
Jacobean drama is certainly in the public domain and anyone
may copy and sell it. But what is the public interest in allowing
the seller to pass the work off as Shakespeare's? Yet, if putting
Shakespeare's name on the cover is not a "false designation of
origin," then there may be no violation of that section of the
Lanham Act.2 ° In its zeal to preserve copyright's public domain,
the Court has arguably misunderstood the task of trademarks
law.
In fairness to the Court, however, the remedy entered by the
district court also failed to respect the different goals these two
forms of intellectual property serve. By awarding Fox twice
Dastar's profits, the district court entered a remedy akin to, if not
in fact more generous than, the relief Fox would have received in
a copyright infringement action. This does make the trademark
claim seem like "a species of mutant copyright law that limits the
public's 'federal right to "copy and to use,"' expired copyrights. 2 1
But the trademarks act in fact gives courts considerable
discretion in fashioning remedies;22 the district court could have
(and the Supreme Court perhaps should have) recognized the
claim, but limited relief to accurate labeling of the copies of the
videos.
Significantly, examples from copyright law illustrate the
distinction between freedom to copy and obligation not to
mislabel as to the goods' origin in a way that is likely to cause
20.
Passing off the anonymous work as Shakespeare's may, however, be a false
statement of fact regarding the work's qualities or characteristics, in violation of section
43(a)(1)(B). Refer to pp. 274-75 infra.
21.
Dastar,123 S. Ct. at 2048 (quoting Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats,
Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 165 (1989)).
22.
See Lanham Trademark Act § 35(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2000) ("If the court
shall find that the amount of the recovery based on profits is either inadequate or
excessive the court may in its discretion enter judgment for such sum as the court shall
find to be just ....").
In addition, the Dastardistrict court entered the remedy without inquiring into
whether the public was likely to be confused regarding the origin of the television series;
rather, it appears to have assumed that confusion would result from the "bodily
appropriation" (very substantial copying) of the Fox series. Because trademarks law
protects the public from market confusion, while copyright protects against copying
regardless of confusion, short-circuiting the inquiry into confusion may also risk turning
trademark claims into a back-up claim for expired copyrights, which was of course the
Court's concern.
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consumer confusion. Thus, copying of protected material that
might otherwise have qualified as an educational fair use may be
deemed "unfair" if the copier intentionally removes reference to
the copied work's author and passes it off as his own.2 3 The Berne
Convention permits free copying for purposes of teaching and
news reporting, but requires that the source be credited.2 4 The
distinction that undergirds these examples should be borne in
mind lest one be tempted to extend to copyrighted works Dastar's
solicitude for untrammeled, uncredited, free copying from public
domain works.
The facts of Dastar point to an additional distinction that
may help preserve some authors' attribution interests. Fox was
the successor in title to Time, Inc., the principal creator of the
television series Crusade in Europe. Thus, Fox's own creative
contribution was more formal than real. Moreover, even if Fox
were the original producer, it did not originate most of the series'
content. As the DastarCourt pointed out, most of the series' film
footage was taken by armed services personnel and news
reporters. Fox (via Time) may have overseen the assembly of the
series' pregenerated components, but even if Fox was the
"originator" of the whole, it was not the "originator" of the parts.
Given the many-layered composition of the series,
[i]f anyone has a claim to being the original creator of the
material used in both the Crusade television series and the
Campaigns videotapes, it would be those groups, rather
than Fox. We do not think the Lanham Act requires this
search for the source of the Nile and all its tributaries.2 5
This objection to recognizing authors as "originators" of
copyrighted works does not apply to works whose creation lacks
the near-archaeological complexity attributed to Crusade, much
less to works of music, drama, photography, and literature, many
of which are single-authored.26
Finally, the Dastar Court left open two avenues within the
trademarks act to vindicate creators' rights. First, the Court
recognized reverse passing off claims when the defendant has
"merely repackaged ... as [his] own" goods which the defendant

See Weissmann v. Freeman, 868 F.2d 1313, 1315-16, 1325 (2d Cir. 1989); see
23.
also Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding removal of plaintiff
photographer's copyright notice part of a pattern of behavior disqualifying from fair use
exception defendant's unauthorized sculpture based on photograph).
24.
Berne Convention, supra note 6, arts. 10(2)-(3), 10b(1).
25.
Dastar,123 S. Ct. at 2049.
26.
Part IV of this Article will consider attribution rights in connection with
multiple-authored works.
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has not otherwise altered. 7 Second, it preserved claims under a
related section of the trademarks act. The Court stated,
If, moreover, the producer of a video that substantially
copied the Crusade series were, in advertising or promotion,
to give purchasers the impression that the video was quite
different from that series, then one or more of the
respondents might have a cause of action-not for reverse
passing off under the "confusion... as to the origin"
provision of § 43(a)(1)(A), but for misrepresentation under
the "misrepresents the nature, characteristics [or] qualities"
provision of § 43(a)(1)(B). For merely saying it is the
producer of the video, however, no Lanham Act liability
attaches to Dastar.2 s
Let us therefore consider whether authors might still
vindicate attribution rights by bringing claims against reverse
passing off through "mere repackaging." I will also assess
whether
authors
would
have
valid
claims
against
misrepresentations of the nature, characteristics, or qualities of a
work of authorship. With respect to what a "mere repackaging"
reverse passing off claim would cover, it is important to recognize
that, notwithstanding Dastar's emphasis on free copying from
the public domain, not every exploitation that the copyright law
might permit will escape Lanham Act condemnation. For
example, the copyright law "first sale doctrine" entitles
purchasers of tangible copies of a work of authorship to resell,
rent, or lend thoae copies without the copyright owner's
authorization. 29 But, even under Dastar,that does not mean that
the Lanham Act will allow me to purchase copies of the latest
Brad Meltzer or John Grisham legal thrillers and resell them
under my own name. In fact, that would seem to be exactly the
situation posited in the Court's caveat that a reverse passing off
claim "would undoubtedly be sustained if [the defendant] had
bought some of [the] Crusade videotapes and merely repackaged
them as its own. 3 °
Nor, despite the Court's linkage of "origin" with physical
copies, should the "mere repackaging" claim be limited to
communication of physical copies originally manufactured by the
27.
Dastar,123 S. Ct. at 2046.
28. Id. at 2050 (alterations in original). Lanham Act section 43(a)(2), 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(a)(1)(B) (2000), prohibits any "false or misleading description of fact, or false or
misleading representation of fact, which.., in commercial advertising or promotion,
misrepresents the nature, characteristics, [or] qualities. . . of his or her or another
person's goods."
29. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2000).
30.
Dastar, 123 S. Ct. at 2046.
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trademarks claimant. For one thing, it would be extraordinarily
formalistic were the "mere repackaging" claim confined to
physical copies that Dastar recycles, thus excluding exact copies
that Dastar reproduces. The "goods" at issue should be
understood to be any physical reproductions, not only the ones
made by the claimant. Otherwise, the statute would reach the
soda company that purchased old Coca-Cola bottles (whose
vintage design is undoubtedly, as a matter of copyright or design
patent law, in the public domain) and refilled them with a
substitute cola, but not the soda company who makes new bottles
in the shape of the Coca-Cola bottle and fills them with the
substitute.31
One might further contend that "mere repackaging" should
not be limited to physical copies of any kind. If Dastar had
broadcast the Crusades series in its entirety, changing only the
name of the producer, then the public's receipt of the repackage
in ephemeral rather than tangible form would seem to be a
distinction without a difference. The designation is equally false
whether the public views the series as a broadcast or on home
video. Moreover, the pertinent section of the Lanham Act covers
any "false designation of origin" "in connection with any goods or
services."3'While copies are "goods," transmissions are generally
considered "services."33 A claim of false designation of origin with
respect to services cannot be analyzed by reference to the
producer of physical copies, because there are none. 34 For
broadcasts and other transmissions, the "origin" would mean the
originator of the content transmitted, that is, the producers and
creator(s) of the programming. In this context, "origin" is not
properly attributed to the originator of the transmission-the
transmitting entity-because the transmitting entity is generally
not the owner of or symbolized by the service mark for the
Cf.id. at 2047 (stating that the Lanham Act "forbids, for example, the Coca-Cola
31.
Company's passing off its product as Pepsi-Cola or reverse passing off Pepsi-Cola as its
product").
Lanham Trademark Act § 43(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (emphasis added).
32.
33.

See, e.g.,

U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, TRADEMARK MANUAL

OF

EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 1301.02(d) (3d ed. 2002) (explaining that titles of radio and
television programs are service marks).
In Williams, the district court rejected plaintiffs claim that defendants' failure
34.
to credit him as a co-author and coproducer of a motion picture released on home video
constituted a false designation of the origin of plaintiffs services as screenwriter and
coproducer. Williams v. UMG Recordings, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1183-84 (C.D. Cal.
2003). The court stated that the subject matter at issue was the "goods," the home video
copies, not of the services plaintiff allegedly contributed to the creation of the work that
defendants distributed in copies. See id. The hypothetical in text, however, addresses false
designation of origin of the content of a transmission, not of physical copies. See id. at
1184-85.
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content transmitted. For example, the classic television series I
Love Lucy may be communicated over many different broadcast
and cable stations. The series' name, its service mark, designates
the series as created and performed in by Lucille Ball and
collaborators; it does not mean the series as transmitted by the
stations that are broadcasting or otherwise communicating it.
This should be true regardless of whether or not the series is still
under copyright.
Exploitations by noncreator copyright owners present
another type of copyright-permitted activity that might run afoul
of the Lanham Act's prohibition on false designations of origin
via "mere repackaging." The Court rather blithely assumed that
attribution of copyrighted works was a nonproblem because the
author who grants rights in the work will be sure to insist that
her licensee gives her appropriate name credit. (Note that this
does not make attribution a right under copyright; it makes
copyright law the leverage for a contract-based claim to
attribution.) But, as we will see when we turn to the discussion of
copyright law, not all creators are copyright owners: some never
are, and others may transfer their copyrights away without being
able to require name credit or without being able to bind
downstream licensees to grant credit. Suppose, for example, that
an actor's name is removed from film credits and another
(fictitious) actor's is put in its place. The actor is not a copyright
owner, but his filmed performance has effectively been
repackaged under another's name. Does his claim survive? Or
suppose I am a novelist; regardless of what my publishing
contract says about name credit, the subsidiary rights agreement
that my publisher enters into with a paperback publisher does
not call for crediting me as the author. If the paperback comes
out under another author's name, I have no contract claim
against this third-party publisher. But the paperback "merely
repackages" my work as someone else's. Do I have a claim
against false designation of origin? Do I have a claim if the
publisher includes my work together with another author's, then
gives credit for the entire work to the other author?3 5 In the latter
case, the publisher may have done more than "merely
repackage"; does that disqualify any claim?
Whether or not the actor or I can still allege false
designation of origin, the DastarCourt's reference to subsisting
35.
Cf. Lamothe v. Atl. Recording Corp., 847 F.2d 1403, 1405 (9th Cir. 1988)
(examining a case where only one of several co-authors was given authorship credit on a
sound recording). According to the Williams court, Dastar effectively overruled the
reverse passing off holding in Lamothe and similar Ninth Circuit decisions. See Williams,
281 F. Supp. 2d at 1184 n.10.
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section 43(a)(1)(B) claims against "false or misleading description
of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact,
[or]
the nature, characteristics,
which ...misrepresent[]
qualities ... of his or her or another person's goods [or] services"
may in some instances preserve a Lanham Act right of action for
authors and performers." Arguably, removing my or the actor's
name and replacing it with another's constitutes a false or
misleading representation of fact (who is the author of this book;
who performed in this film) that misrepresents the nature,
characteristics, or qualities (authorship; performance) of the
goods (the work). Note that, for purposes of section 43(a)(1)(B),
the Court appears to have acknowledged that "goods" can mean a
"communicative work," while, for purposes of section 43(a)(1)(A),
"goods" would mean only the physical copies. Query whether it
makes sense for "goods" to mean two different things in these
adjacent sections. In any event, the potential availability of a
section 43(a)(1)(B) claim becomes particularly significant if, after
Dastar, the "origin" of copyrighted works is falsely designated
only when the entire work is misattributed, or worse, only when
physical copies are mislabeled as to their manufacture.
Suppose, for example, that a famous novelist grants film rights
in his book. Apart from its title, the resulting movie bears only the
slightest resemblance to the underlying literary work. But,
recognizing the market value of the author's name, the motion
picture company promotes the film (without the author's
permission) as "Stephen King's The Lawnmower Man."7 Or suppose
that a copyright-licensed U.S. broadcaster airs a truncated version
of Monty Python's Flying Circus, presenting it as the work of the
British comedy troupe even though the troupe did not approve the
broadcaster's removal of approximately one-third of the content." In
both cases, the attribution to the creators is misleading, not to say,
vastly overstated. Presenting the work as "Stephen King's" when
virtually the only thing in the film that is still the writer's is the
title, or as "Monty Python's" when the editing has garbled it, might
falsely describe the nature, characteristics, or qualities of the work.
The DastarCourt indicated that a claim for false representation of
the nature of the work could lie if Dastar promoted its modestly
altered videos as "quite different" from the Fox originals when they
in fact are quite the same; conversely, a claim should remain
available if a work is promoted as being "by" an author when its

36.
37.
38.

Dastar, 123 S. Ct. at 2046 n.4.
See King v. Innovation Books, 976 F.2d 824, 826-27 (2d Cir. 1992).
See Gilliam v. ABC, 538 F.2d 14, 17-18 (2d Cir. 1976).
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purveyor has in fact made it "quite different" from the work the
author created. 9
These examples offer variants of traditional "passing off'
claims: a version that the author claims is so altered that it no
longer represents his work is sold as if it were the real thing.
Although the "goods" are a work of authorship, this is
analytically akin to passing off a fake Fendi bag as though it
were the genuine article. The same is true of the anonymous
sixteenth-century poet whom I sell as Shakespeare. Would a
"false representation" claim also lie if I engage in "reverse
passing off'? Suppose that, rather than purchasing copies of the
latest Brad Meltzer legal thriller and affixing my name to themconduct still actionable under the Lanham Act after Dastar-I
make new copies and sell them under my name? Under Dastar,I
am the "origin" of the copies (or perhaps my publisher is), so a
section 43(a)(1)(A) claim against me fails. But I have also made a
"false representation of fact which ... misrepresents the nature,
characteristics [or] qualities," that is, the authorship, of my
literary work ("goods"). If Brad Meltzer can make out the
remaining elements of a claim for "misrepresent[ations of] the
nature, characteristics, [or] qualities," then the effects of Dastar
may not be as disastrous for creators as the Court's concept of
origin might initially portend.
This analysis, however, may suggest too simple a sleight of
hand: next time, all an author-or, more significantly, Twentieth
Century Fox-need do is plead section 43(a)(1)(B) instead of
43(a)(1)(A). But this critique overlooks the consumer protection
focus of section 43(a). Section 43(a), unlike section 32, does not
require that the claimant be a trademark registrant. This is
because section 43(a) targets a wider range of deceitful
marketplace activity, including misleading trade dress imitation
and false advertising. The objective is not to create new rights for
unregistered merchants, but to protect the public. 40 This in turn
39.
See 4 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 3, § 27:77.1, at 27-149.
The Court hypothesized that if a producer of a video that substantially copied
Fox's Crusade television series were, in advertising or promotion, to give
purchasers the impression that the video was "quite different from that series,"
then Fox might have a claim for false advertising for misrepresenting the
nature, characteristics or qualities of the creative content of the product in
violation of § 43(a)(1)(B). That is, in this hypothetical, the defendant would be
making a false statement about the content of its communicative product.
Id. (footnote omitted). McCarthy also notes that the false advertising prong contains a
restriction that the "trademark prong" does not: the misrepresentation must be "in
commercial advertising or promotion." Id. at 27-149 to 27-150 (internal quotation marks
omitted). This is "not an insignificant limitation." Id. at 27-150.
40.
See id. § 27:14, at 27-25 to 27-27.
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suggests that the application of section 43(a)(1)(B) to
misrepresentations regarding the "nature," et cetera, of
"communicative goods" should be limited to misrepresentations
material to the consumer. This standard may also help us avoid
the "Nile and all its tributaries" problem: in Dastar,Fox was not
the actual creator of the World War II film footage, nor is it clear
what was Fox's role in the creation of the television series. In
other words, from the consumer's point of view, accurate
information about Fox's or Dastar's relationship to the contents
of the audiovisual work (as opposed to the production of the
physical copies) may not have mattered.
By contrast, knowing who is the actual creator generally is
material to the purchasing decision.41 This observation may also
be key to resolving the potential tension in the post-Dastar
treatment of copyrighted and public domain works. The Dastar
facts and policies permit a distinction allowing section 43(a)
misattribution claims to persist for still-copyrighted works, but
the distinction is justified more as damage control than on
principle. As the example of the anonymous sixteenth-century
poet sold as Shakespeare indicates, the public can be materially
misled with regard to the authorship of public domain works, too.
Consider another instance of copyright-permissible material
deception: copyright does not protect the ideas, information, or
processes that a work discloses. As a result, copyright protection
for a work such as a cookbook is typically "thin," covering the
chefs literary flourishes, but not the culinary preparations
themselves. As a matter of copyright law, therefore, I am free to
The courts have nearly unanimously held that § 43(a) provides a federal
vehicle for assertion of infringement of even unregistered marks and names. As
the Second Circuit remarked, § 43(a) "is the only provision in the Lanham Act
that protects an unregistered mark" and "Its purpose is to prevent consumer
confusion regarding a product's source ....
Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting Centaur Communications, Ltd. v. A/S/M Communications,
Inc., 830 F.2d 1217, 1220 (2d Cir. 1987)).
41.
For example, Amazon.com's Web site alone contains more than 11,000 usages of
the phrase "from the author of." See http://www.google.com/search?sourceid=navclient&ie
=UTF-8&oe=UTF-8&q=site:www%2Eamazon%2Ecom+%22from+the+author+of%22 (last
visited Apr. 16, 2004). By contrast, in the case of movie ads, the "from the director/author
of' phrase often does not contain that director/author's name, but only the name of the
previous popular work; one has to search further for the name of that director/author.
This suggests that the advertiser-usually the motion picture producer-perceives more
commercial value in the name of the previously successful motion picture than in the
name(s) of its creator(s). Current film The Last Samurai (Warner Brothers Entertainment
Inc. 2003) is advertised as "from the director of 'Legends of the Fall' and 'Glory" (Edward
Zwick). See http://lastsamurai.warnerbros.com/index.php?c=6 (last visited Mar. 17, 2004).
The film The Day After Tomorrow (Twentieth Century Fox 2004) is being promoted as
"from the director of 'Independence Day'" (Roland Emmerich). See http://www.apple.com
/trailers/fox/dayaftertomorrow (last visited Mar. 17, 2004) (trailer).

278

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

[41:2

publish my own cookbook appropriating the ingredients and
following the steps needed to produce Nigella Lawson's or Emeril
Lagasse's latest creations. Moreover, because U.S. copyright law
says nothing about how I label the unprotected material that I
copy, any express or implied fair use obligation to credit one's
sources would not extend to mere copying of public domain
elements. Nonetheless, copyright's free pass on copying should
not also mean that no law will prohibit me from representingthat
the gastronomy I describe is of my own devising. Section
43(a)(1)(B), with its focus on consumer protection, should supply
that prohibition.
But, even if authorship is or can be a "characteristic" of the
work, the section 43(a)(1)(B) violation does not occur unless the
misrepresentation takes place in "commercial advertising or
promotion."4 2 Simply mislabeling and selling the work without
advertising the name substitution may not constitute
"promotion"; the statutory text suggests that the mislabeler
has
called attention to the false information. One might expect that
there would be no market for an unpromoted work, so that in
most instances the requisite "commercial advertising or
promotion" will occur. But the promotion might not always go to
the alleged false representation. For example, if the miscredited
actor did not perform in a featured role, his (or his false
substitute's) name might not appear on posters and
advertisements for the film. In those instances, it is not clear
that the spurned author or performer will have a claim. (It may
also be questionable whether the misrepresentation of a tertiary
actor's name is material to consumer choice.)
There is an additional problem: even were the false
representation of the fact of authorship to occur in commercial
advertising or promotion, the author may not have standing
under the Lanham Act to bring the claim. (In fairness, the
standing problem also pertained to claims of false designation of
origin and may further illustrate the incomplete coverage the
Lanham Act afforded authors even before Dastar.)The problem
is the following: section 43(a) is generally perceived as creating a
federal claim against certain kinds of unfair competition;43 in that
case, some courts have concluded, the parties to a 43(a) claim
should be competitors. In those courts' view, however, authors
may not be "in competition" with licensees or others who fail to

42.
Lanham Act § 43(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B) (2000).
43.
4 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 3, § 27.7 (telling the history of
Lanham Act section 43(a)).
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respect their attribution claims." Thus, even if a false description
can bring it. 45
claim survives, it is not clear whether an author
Ultimately, however, attempts to salvage authors' claims
against misattribution under section 43(a) prove strained or
insufficient." More importantly, restoring the pre-Dastarstatus
quo at least for copyrighted works will redress only false
attributions, not nonattributions, of authorship. And because the
Lanham Act, properly understood, is consumer-oriented rather
than author-focused, the materiality test implicit in this reading
may exclude some authors' claims.
We turn now to copyright law-a law that is, at least in part,
author-oriented, though we find that, when it comes to credit, the
current act offers even fewer grains than can be gleaned from the
trademarks field after Dastar'sdevastating passage.
III. COPYRIGHT: THE U.S. LAW OF AUTHORS' RIGHTS
RECOGNIZES FEW AUTHORS

In excluding communicative goods from the reach of false
designation of "origin" claims, the Dastar Court appears to have
assumed that the author who licenses rights in her work would
always ensure that she receives authorship credit. 7 Under the
Court's assumption, even if the Copyright Act lacked an explicit
provision for attribution rights, the author's control over the
reproduction and other exploitation rights would de facto extend
to implementing an attribution right. The Court may also have
thought it unlikely as a practical matter that a licensee would
refuse or neglect to give the author name credit, particularly as
See, e.g., Halicki v. United Artists Communications, Inc., 812 F.2d 1213, 1214
44.
(9th Cir. 1987).
See Cleary v. News Corp., 30 F.3d 1255 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that creators of
45.
works made for hire had contracted away their attribution rights).
For an even more aggressively apocalyptic reading, see David A. Gerber,
46.
Copyright Reigns-Supreme: Notes on Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.,
93 TRADEMARK REP. 1029, 1032 (2003) ("[Although DastarCorp. involved reverse passing
off, its sweep is much wider. The brightline rule rejecting authorial claims under § 43(a)
should lead to the death not only of the droit A la paternit6 or right of attribution, but
other 'moral rights' under § 43(a) as well."). Note, however, that Gerber is not a
disinterested commentator: he was Dastar's counsel. Id. at 1029.
See Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 123 S. Ct. 2041, 2050
47.
(2003).
The creative talent of the sort that lay behind the Campaigns videos is not
left without protection. The original film footage used in the Crusade television
series could have been copyrighted ... as was copyrighted (as a compilation) the
Crusade television series, even though it included material from the public
domain .... Had Fox renewed the copyright in the Crusade television series, it
would have had an easy claim of copyright infringement.
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the author's name may serve as a selling point for the work. But
these assumptions may have been unfounded.
First, under the Copyright Act, not every creator of a work of
authorship is a statutory "author" with power to license rights in
the work. Creators of "works made for hire"-employees and
freelance contributors to specified categories of works-have no
copyright rights in the works they write, perform, or otherwise
execute.48 The Copyright Act vests all economic control in the
employer or hiring party. As a result, under that statute, the
creator has no copyright rights to leverage into an attribution
right.49 In some cases, collective bargaining agreements negotiate
attribution rights for certain classes of creators. ° But, whether
by choice or because of lack of organization, many freelance
creators are not unionized, and these agreements do not assist
nonunion creators. Moreover, even in traditionally unionized
sectors, creators may encounter resistance from statutory
copyright owners. For example, to an increasing extent,
screenwriters and other creative contributors to television
programming are facing demands from television producers to
cut the "credits" that follow the broadcast.'
Second, even where the creator is the "author," any
attribution right remains purely a creature of contract; if the
contract does not specify a right to credit, then no such right
exists, because no statute lurks in the background to afford a
default right of attribution. Third, because the right is purely
contractual, it does not reach third parties, including subsequent
licensees.52
48. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (defining "work made for hire"); id. § 201(b)
(explaining that an employer for hire "owns all of the rights comprised in the copyright").
49. The creator may, however (at least in theory), bargain for attribution rights in
the employment contract or as a condition of signing a commissioned work made for hire
agreement.
50.
See, e.g., Article 8 of the Writers Guild of America-East, "Basic Agreement" for
Theatrical and Television (effective May 2, 2001 through May 1, 2004), which provides
that "The Company" shall give credits for screen authorship "only pursuant to the terms
of and in the manner prescribed in the applicable [attached Schedule A]." Theatrical
Schedule A contains thirty paragraphs setting forth credit requirements; Television
Schedule A contains thirty-one such paragraphs.
51.
See, e.g., International Documentary Association, IDA Responds to Elimination
of Credits, Cinematography.com, at http://www.cinematography.com/index.asp?news
ID=16 (last visited Mar. 17, 2004). Producers express concern that audiences lose
attention during the 30-second credit "crawl" and switch to other channels; it is not
apparent that the two or more minutes of commercials that typically follow the credit
"crawl" have any greater claim on the audiences' loyalty, however. See id.
52. A recent controversy in the related area of integrity rights illustrates the
problem. Motion picture directors, as employees for hire, are not copyright owners.
Collective bargaining agreements, or individual directors' negotiating power, may confer
on the director some control over the alterations the motion picture producer seeks to
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But is the copyright situation really so dire? After all, when
the United States joined the Berne Convention, effective March
1989, we committed to enforce its article 6b' moral rights,
including the "right to claim authorship," at least with respect to
foreign Berne Union authors.53 In the Berne Convention
Implementation Act of 1988,"4 however, the United States
declined to implement article 6b"' on the ground that a patchwork
of federal and state claims formed a rough equivalent to the
article 6b" guarantees of the rights of integrity and of
attribution.5 5 Were we fibbing? Some would say "Yes," noting that
the Berne Convention has no provision against scoff laws" and
that the United States made sure that the TRIPS accord-which
incorporates
Berne
but
also
supplies
sanctions
for
noncompliance-excluded article 6"'." A less cynical view of
Berne adherence would assert that Congress in 1988 made the
"rough equivalence" claim in good faith, for it could not have
anticipated that the Lanham Act might vanish from the vaunted
"patchwork.""s
As might be expected given the position taken on Berne
adherence, Congress has not subsequently established an explicit
make to the work. But third parties are not bound by these arrangements. As a result,
even if the director succeeds in resisting the producer's demands to remove or shorten
portions of the film, a third party entrepreneur who distributes motion pictures sanitized
of sex, violence, or vulgarity (and clearly advises consumers of the excisions) has violated
no rights of the film director (though the entrepreneur may be violating the derivative
works copyright of the motion picture studios). Cf Huntsman v. Soderbergh, No. 02-M1662 (D. Colo. filed Aug. 29, 2002).
53.
The Berne Convention does not require that Member States apply the
conventional minimum rights to their own authors. See Berne Convention, supra note 6,
art. 5(3).
54.
Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat.
2853 (1988).
55.
See Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, S.REP. No. 100-352, at 9-10
(1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3706, 3714-15; see also Gilliam v. ABC, 538 F.2d
14, 24-25 (2d Cir. 1976) (applying a Lanham Act section 43(a) false designation of origin
claim to a truncated broadcast of Monty Python television programs).
56.
See, e.g., A. Dietz, The United States and Moral Rights: Idiosyncrasy or
Approximation? Observations on a ProblematicalRelationship Underlying United States'
Adherence to the Berne Convention, 142 REVUE INTERNATIONALE Du DROIT DAUTEUR 222
(Oct. 1989); see also Tyler T. Ochoa, Introduction: Rights of Attribution, Section 43(a) of
the Lanham Act, and the Copyright Public Domain, 24 WHITTIER L. REV. 911, 925-28
(2003) (stating that without express statutory coverage of the attribution right, the
United States is not in compliance with Berne article 6").
57.
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, arts. 9-14, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex 1C, Results of the Uruguay Round vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1201 (1994).
58.
In most of the other instances in which the United States clearly did not comply
with Berne norms, Congress did amend other provisions of the Copyright Act, for
example, with respect to the formalities of notice and registration. See Berne Convention
Implementation Act §§ 7-9.
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right of attribution of general application. The enactment in 1990
of the Visual Artists Rights Act (VARA)59 did grant limited
attribution rights, but only with respect to an extremely narrow
class of works. The class of "work[s] of visual art"6" is confined to
the original work or up to two hundred signed and numbered
copies of a painting, drawing, print, sculpture, or a photographic
image "produced for exhibition purposes only," so long as the
work is not "made for hire."61 VARA affords artists whose works
fall within its restrictive definition a kind of private "Landmarks"
law to preserve their works against mutilation or destruction.
Attribution rights, albeit included, are not the focus of the Act.
Indeed, VARA's restriction to physical originals makes that
statute a very feeble measure for enforcing artists' attribution
rights: a "work of visual arts" excludes mass market multiples,
and VARA attribution (as well as integrity) rights apply only to
"works of visual art." Thus, there is no VARA right to compel
attribution for one's artwork if the artist's name has been left off
anything more than the original or a signed and numbered
limited edition of two hundred. And, of course, VARA does
nothing for literary, musical, or most other authors.
Worse, under a truly pernicious reading of VARA, the Dastar
Court appears to suggest that VARA's enactment promotes a
negative inference that VARA is the only federal law locus for
attribution rights: if authors already enjoyed attribution rights,
VARA would be superfluous, and "[a] statutory interpretation that
renders another statute superfluous is of course to be avoided."62
This is both perverse and wrong. It is perverse because, given
VARA's very limited coverage, the result of this reading is to leave
most authors with fewer attribution rights post-VARA than before.
While statutes should to be read to avoid superfluity, they should
also be read to avoid impairing our treaty obligations. 3 A reading
that makes our Berne compliance even less plausible than before
should not have recommended itself to the Court.
59.
60.
61.
62.
(2003).

Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 § 603, 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2000).
See 17 U.S.C. § 101.
Id.
Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 123 S. Ct. 2041, 2048

63.
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 114 (1987) ("Where fairly possible, a United States statute is to be

construed so as not to conflict with international law or with an international agreement
of the United States."); see also Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2
Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (stating that statutes should be interpreted consistently with
customary international law); see also generally Ralph G. Steinhardt, The Role of
InternationalLaw as a Canon of Domestic Statutory Construction,43 VAND. L. REV. 1103
(1990).
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Second, the Court's suggestion is wrong because section
43(a) does not make VARA superfluous. There may be narrow
areas of overlap, but VARA, in its severely constricted zone,
affords a significant right that section 43(a) does not: an
affirmative right to claim authorship, not merely a right to object
to misrepresentations of authorship that confuse consumers as to
the work's origin. Moreover, VARA's beneficiaries are artists, but
section 43(a)'s are the consuming public, and, as discussed
earlier, the rationales for the laws are different. Courts
addressing overlapping intellectual property claims have
acknowledged that differently motivated laws may yield similar
results when brought to bear on the same subject matter, yet one
does not drive out the other.64
If VARA, at best, offers too little in the way of attribution
rights, the rest of the Copyright Act and of Title 17 are of no help
either. Or, perhaps more accurately, nothing else in the
Copyright Act explicitly recognizes attribution rights, and before
1998, nothing in that statute could be construed to afford
attribution rights. The much-derided Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (DMCA),65 however, may contain the seeds of a
general attribution right; with sufficient ingenuity and effort,
these seeds might be made to germinate. The seeds may be found
in the § 1202 provision on "Copyright Management Information."
This provision was introduced as part of legislation
implementing the 1996 WIPO Copyright Treaty." Section 1202
prohibits (a) knowingly providing false copyright management
information, with the intent to facilitate or conceal infringement.
The provision also prohibits (b) knowingly or intentionally
altering or removing copyright management information,
knowing (or having reasonable grounds to know) that the
alteration or removal will facilitate or conceal infringement.
Subsection (c) defines copyright management information. The
definition includes the name of the author, the name of the
64.
See, e.g., Frederick Warne & Co. v. Book Sales, Inc., 481 F. Supp. 1191, 1196-99
(S.D.N.Y. 1979) (stating that a publisher of children's books in the public domain could
bring a trademark claim against defendant's copying of particular illustrations from the
book, and commenting that "[b]ecause the nature of the property right conferred by
copyright is significantly different from that of trademark, trademark protection should
be able to co-exist, and possibly to overlap, with copyright protection without posing
preemption difficulties"); cf.Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141
(1989) (holding that federal design patent law preempts state laws protecting against
copying of boat hull designs but does not preempt state laws protecting consumers against
misleading presentations of products).
65.
Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 17 U.S.C.).
66.
World Intellectual Property Organization: Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 36
I.L.M. 65 (1997) [hereinafter WIPO Treaty].
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copyright owner, and the "[t]erms and conditions for use of the
work."" Inclusion of the author's name in protected copyright
management information suggests that the copyright law finally
affords authors of all works, not just "works of visual art," a right
to recognition of their authorial status. Unfortunately, as we
shall see, the situation is a little more complicated.
Section 1202 was designed to promote the dissemination of
copyrighted works by facilitating the grant or license of rights under
copyright (particularly through electronic contracting). Because
accurate and reliable information about the work is essential to its
lawful distribution (particularly online), § 1202 identifies that
information and protects it against falsification, removal, or
alteration. There are, however, some respects in which § 1202
ensures the desired reliability and accuracy only imperfectly.
Moreover, the text does not fulfill all U.S. obligations under article
12 of the WIPO treaty. Article 12 requires contracting parties to
prohibit, inter alia, unauthorized removal or alteration of electronic
rights management information when the actor knows or has
reasonable grounds to know that the removal or alteration "will
induce, enable, facilitate or conceal an infringement of any right
covered by this Treaty or [by] the Berne Convention."' The "right[s]
covered by the Berne Convention" are not only those found within
Title 17. Article 6bi of the Berne Convention declares authors' rights
"to claim authorship of the work." 9 As mentioned earlier, when the
United States adhered to the Berne Convention, Congress
announced its position that it was not necessary to incorporate the
article 6b right of attribution into the body of the Copyright Act,
because other provisions of United States law, federal and state,
adequately assured that right.7' This means that misidentifying the
author of a copyrighted work might have violated some legal norms
in the United States, but it would not have been copyright
infringement. Thus, § 1202 falls short of the WIPO treaty
requirement, because § 1202 concerns only copyright management
information whose removal or alteration facilitates or conceals
copyright infringement. Removal or alteration of copyright
management information identifying the author of the work would
violate the WIPO norm, but because it is not copyright infringement
even willfully to miscredit the author, there would be no violation of

67.
68.
69.
70.

17 U.S.C. § 1202(c) (2000).
WIPO Treaty, supra note 66, art. 12 (emphasis added).
Berne Convention, supra note 6, art. 6 b"( 1 ).
Refer to notes 55-58 supra and accompanying text.
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§ 1202, unless it could be shown that miscrediting authorship
induces infringement.7'
There is another way in which § 1202 falls short of
generalizing a right of attribution to Berne levels. The DMCA
does recognize the importance of and public benefit of authorship
credit, for § 1202(c)'s definition of copyright management
information includes "[t]he name of, and other identifying
information about, the author of a work. 7 2 But § 1202 does not
oblige the rights owner to attach copyright management
information to distributions of the work. At most, § 1202
instructs the rights owner who does choose to attach copyright
management information that the information should include the
name of the author.73 Even then, however, § 1202 does not dictate
that a copyright owner who chooses to include some of the
information listed in § 1202 as "Copyright Management
Information" must therefore include all of it. As a result, § 1202
gives authors no guarantee that statutory protection of copyright
management information will cover their names.
To some extent, the U.S. Copyright Office may fill in the
gaps in the copyright management information scheme. Section
1202(c)(8)'s definition of copyright management information
provides a residual category of "[s]uch other information as the
Register of. Copyrights may prescribe by regulation." For
example, although the statute lists "[t]he name of, and other
identifying information about, the author of a work,"7 4 the statute
does not reveal whether "author" in this context means the
statutory author/employer for hire, or the actual creator. Thus, it
is not clear whether the creator of a work made for hire also
should receive authorship credit. 5 The Copyright Office could
write
regulations
interpreting
copyright
management
information to provide for authorship credit to the contributors to
a work made for hire as well as to creators who are initial
71.
Arguably, improper authorship credit could complicate or defeat title searching
and rights clearance, leading some users to infringe in frustration, but this seems rather
attenuated (particularly if other licensing information is not tampered with).
72.
17 U.S.C. § 1202(c)(2).
73.
The definition of copyright management information appears to give the rights
owner the option of including some, but not all, of the listed elements. See id. § 1202(c)
("[T]he term 'copyright management information' means any of the following
information...." (emphasis added)). But the definition also empowers the Copyright
Office to "prescribe" other information by regulation. See id. § 1202(c)(8). The Copyright
Office thus might make inclusion of the author's name a mandatory ingredient of
copyright management information.
74.
Id. § 1202(c)(2).
75.
Cf.id. § 1202(c)(5) (requiring that the information identify the screenwriter,
performers, and director of an audiovisual work). Audiovisual works can be works made
for hire under § 101.
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copyright holders. Consistent with the earlier discussion of the
optional character of the statutory list, however, it is unlikely
that the Copyright Office may by regulation compel the inclusion
of this information.
IV. PUTTING THE RIGHT TO CLAIM AUTHORSHIP INTO THE U.S.
COPYRIGHT ACT (WHERE IT BELONGS)

Ultimately, an amendment to the U.S. Copyright Act to
provide an explicit and general right of attribution of authorship
may be necessary to afford meaningful rights to authors, as well
as to preserve Berne compliance. Even before Dastar,U.S. law
afforded only incomplete coverage of authors' attribution
interests.76 The absence of general protection in the Copyright
Act, and the doubt the Supreme Court has cast on the continuing
viability of authors' Lanham Act claims, together could afford the
occasion to enact legislation specifically designed to recognize
attribution rights. This Part of the Article will imagine what
such legislation should say.
An initial question concerns the constitutional basis for a
federal attribution right. Does the Copyright Clause's
authorization to Congress to secure the exclusive rights of
authors in their writings include the power to enact moral as well
as economic rights?77 The constitutional text hardly compels the
interpretation that the "exclusive Right" is exclusively pecuniary.
Although the first copyright statute and its successors provided
only for the economic rights to print, publish, and vend," that
should not prompt an originalist negative inference that the
Constitution restricts Congress's power to the rights (and subject
matter) selected for coverage in the first copyright statutes. Such
76.
See, e.g., Kwall, The Attribution Right, supra note 8, at 1020-25 ("[Pllaintiffs
attempting to obtain a remedy for reverse passing off are disserved through their forced
reliance on section 43(a) to redress violations that should properly be addressed within
the scope of an independent right of attribution."); see also Ochoa, supra note 56, at 927
(stating that U.S. trade negotiators insisted on excluding moral rights from the scope of
the TRIPs agreement "for the obvious reason that U.S. officials knew that we were not in
compliance with Article 6bis [of the Berne Convention] and did not want to have our noncompliance officially adjudicated by the WTO, which would result in international
embarrassment and possibly severe trade sanctions as well").
77.
The question of its constitutional authority to legislate moral rights appears not
to have troubled Congress at the time it enacted VARA. Congress simply assumed it had
the requisite power: the House Report confidently asserts that "[airtists' rights are
consistent with the purpose behind the copyright laws and the Constitutional provision
they implement: 'To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.'" See H.R. REP. No.
101-514, at 5 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 6915.
78.
Copyright Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124, 124 (granting authors of
maps, charts, and books the "sole right and liberty of printing, reprinting, publishing and
vending" such maps, charts, and books).
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an inference would exclude from congressional prerogative not
only moral rights, but also the pecuniary rights, such as
translation and public performance rights, that Congress later
brought within the statutory grant. "Exclusive Right" implies
authors' control over their works; ensuring attribution is one
element of that control. In addition, exercise of that kind of
control is fully consistent with the constitutional goal of
authorizing exclusive rights: to promote the progress of
knowledge. In the constitutional scheme, exclusive rights are an
impetus to authorship. Name recognition can furnish an
important incentive to create and disseminate works: fame may,
after all, bring fortune, and if fortune is not forthcoming, glory or
notoriety may (at least for a time) console those whom the
market has yet to reward.
Any attribution rights statute must address the following
issues:
1. Who are the beneficiaries of the attribution right?
2.

What acts violate the attribution right?

3.

May the right be transferred or waived?

The first question is misleadingly simple: the right is one of
attribution of authorship; therefore, authors are the right's
beneficiaries. But who is an "author"? Are employed creators
"authors" for this purpose, even if in the United States they are
not copyright holders? If many creators contributed to the work,
are they all entitled to credit? How significant must a creative
contribution be before attribution rights attach?
The second question may prove similarly elusive. There may be
situations in which omission of credit may be reasonable, but can a
statute realistically specify what those situations would be? On the
other hand, would an open-ended reasonableness exception end up
swallowing the rule?
As to the third question, statutory provision for waivers may
better alleviate the problems to which a reasonableness exception
seeks to respond, but a waiver option raises similar concerns
regarding the effectiveness of the right. On the one hand, in
appropriate circumstances, authors and licensees should be able to
make private arrangements to blur, blunt, or renounce rights to
credit; ghostwriter agreements come to mind in this context. But a
general and generous allowance for waivers could lead to boilerplate
contracts that gut any meaningful enjoyment of the right regardless
of context.
Other common law countries' legislation might offer helpful
examples of implementation of the attribution right. We will look to
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the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Canada, and Australia, because
similarities in their and our copyright and general legal cultures may
make their laws more persuasive points of departure than the
continental statutes that some U.S. authorities tend to view with
skepticism, if not derision.79 Moreover, the Commonwealth
legislation, on the whole, is of recent vintage. With the exception of
Canada, whose bijuridical tradition may account for its earlier
recognition of moral rights, these States did not explicitly incorporate
attribution rights into their copyright statutes until 1988 or later."0
After surveying these Commonwealth countries' attribution
rights, I will address VARA's treatment of infringement and of
waivers. I will consider whether these provisions, if applied to a
broader range of authors and of subject matter than VARA currently
reaches, might, when combined with the best features of the
Commonwealth legislation, produce a workable and effective
attribution right for U.S. authors and performers.
A. Attribution Rights in Commonwealth Legislation
1. United Kingdom (andNew Zealand). The attribution right
in the 1988 U.K. Copyright Designs and Patents Act (CDPA), as in
its New Zealand echo,"' is grudgingly given and easily lost.
a. Beneficiaries. The beneficiaries of the CDPA's
attribution right include authors of literary, dramatic, musical,
or artistic works. 2 But in the U.K. copyright statute, "author"
encompasses more than "the person [(or persons)] who creates" a
See Jon Baumgarten, Robert A. Gorman & Christopher Meyer, Preserving the
79.
Genius of the System-A Critical Examination of Moral Rights into United States Law, 8
COPYRIGHT REP. 1, 1-20 (1990); see also Lawrence Adam Beyer, Intentionalism, Art, and the
Suppression of Innovation: Film Colorization and the Philosophyof Moral Rights, 82 Nw. U. L.
REV. 1011, 1112 (1988) ("E]nactment of statutes that embody a 'moral right of integrity' for
auteurs is an unsound and lamentable step toward the suppression of innovation, artistic and
otherwise."); Robert A. Gorman, Federal Moral Rights Legislation: The Need for Caution, 14
NOVA L. REv. 421, 421-22 (1990) (arguing that comprehensive moral rights legislation is illadvised because it conflicts sharply with fundamental United States legal principles and would
disrupt longstanding practices in the entertainment and cultural industries).
80. The United Kingdom adopted moral rights in the 1988 Copyright, Designs and
Patents Act (CDPA). Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, ch. 48 (U.K). The New
Zealand Copyright Act 1994 adopts much of the statutory language used in the CDPA,
including its provisions on moral rights; the provisions relevant to the attribution right are in
Part 4 of the Copyright Act, sections 94-97. Copyright Act 1994, pt. 4, §§ 94-97 (N.Z.).
Australia's moral rights amendments were enacted in 2000. Copyright Amendment (Moral
Rights) Act 2000 (Austl.). Canada codified Berne Convention article 6 in 1931, but more
recently amended the moral rights provisions, in 1988. Copyright Act, R.S.C., ch. C-42 (1985)
(Can.).
Refer to note 80 supra.
81.
82.
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, ch. 48, § 77 (U.K.).
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work.8 3 The Act further specifies who "[tihat person shall be
taken to be," 4 and this depends on what kind of work is at issue.
For example, if the work is a sound recording or a film, the
author is "the person by whom the arrangements necessary for
the making of the recording or film are undertaken."8 5 This in
turn confers authorship status on producers. However, the moral
rights provision specifies that the "director of a copyright film"
has a right to be identified as the "director of the work" and
creates a distinction between authors and directors." Creators of
computer programs and employees who create works in the
course of employment do not enjoy attribution rights.87 As in the
United States, copyright in a work originally vests in the author's
employer "[wihere ... [the] work is made by an employee in the
course of his employment ... subject to any agreement to the
contrary."8
b. Scope of the Attribution Right. The attribution right
entitles its beneficiaries to an identification that is "clear and
reasonably prominent."8 9 The meaning of the right to be
identified varies according to the type of work and the
circumstances. In most cases, the right is "to be identified in a
manner likely to bring his identity to the attention of a person
seeing or hearing the performance, exhibition, showing,
broadcast or cable programme in question."9 The circumstances
that trigger the right also vary according to the type of work. For
example, in the case of a literary work, the right is triggered
whenever "(a) the work is published commercially, performed in
public, broadcast or included in a cable programme service; or
(b) copies of a film or sound recording including the work are
issued to the public."9' Limitations applicable to copyright also
apply to the right of attribution, including fair dealing, incidental
inclusion in an artistic work, sound recording, film, broadcast, or
cable program, and the exclusion and limitation of artistic

83.
See id. § 9.
84. Id. § 9(2).
85.
Id. § 9(2)(a).
86.
Id. § 77(1).
87.
Id. § 79.
88.
Id. § 11(2); see also id. § 79(3)(a).
89.
Id. § 77(7).
90.
Id. § 77(7)(c).
91.
Id. § 77(2). The Act also prohibits false attributions of authorship. See id.
§ 84(5)-(6); Lionel Bently & William R. Cornish, United Kingdom, in 2 MELVILLE B.
NIMMER & PAUL EDWARD GELLER, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE
§ 7(1)(b) (2003) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE].
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copyright in industrial designs.92 Several of the fair dealing
exceptions, however, require attribution of the copied source."
Most importantly, to enjoy the attribution right, the author
94
or other designated beneficiary must "assert" it. Assertion may
be made by way of a statement in an instrument assigning
copyright, in another instrument in writing signed by the author
or director, or by requiring identification on the "original or copy,
95
or on a frame, mount or other thing to which it is attached" of
an artistic work, and binds only those who receive actual or
constructive notice of the assertion.9 6 In addition, in an action for
See Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, ch. 48, § 79(4) (U.K.).
92.
Id. § 30.
93.
Id. § 77(1) ("[T]he right is not infringed unless it has been asserted in
94.
accordance with section 78.").
Id. § 78(3)(a).
95.
The Act contains "elaborate provisions on the making of effective assertions and
96.
the extent to which other persons are bound by them." Lionel Bently & William R.
Cornish, United Kingdom, in 2 INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE, supra
note 91, § 7(1)(a). CDPA section 78 states the following:
(1) A person does not infringe the right conferred by section 77 (right to be
identified as author or director) by doing any of the acts mentioned in that
section unless the right has been asserted in accordance with the following
provisions so as to bind him in relation to that act.
(2) The right may be asserted generally, or in relation to any specified act or
description of acts(a) on an assignment of copyright in the work, by including in the
instrument effecting the assignment a statement that the author or director
asserts in relation to that work his right to be identified, or
(b) by instrument in writing signed by the author or director.
(3) The right may also be asserted in relation to the public exhibition of an
artistic work(a) by securing that when the author or other first owner of copyright
parts with possession of the original, or of a copy made by him or under his
direction or control, the author is identified on the original or copy, or on a
frame, mount or other thing to which it is attached, or
(b) by including in a licence by which the author or other first owner of
copyright authorises the making of copies of the work a statement signed by
or on behalf of the person granting the licence that the author asserts his
right to be identified in the event of the public exhibition of a copy made in
pursuance of the licence.
(4) The persons bound by an assertion of the right under subsection (2) or (3)
are(a) in the case of an assertion under subsection (2)(a), the assignee and
anyone claiming through him, whether or not he has notice of the assertion;
(b) in the case of an assertion under subsection (2)(b), anyone to whose
notice the assertion is brought;
(c) in the case of an assertion under subsection (3)(a), anyone into whose
hands that original or copy comes, whether or not the identification is still
present or visible;
(d) in the case of an assertion under subsection (3)(b), the licensee and
anyone into whose hands a copy made in pursuance of the licence comes,
whether or not he has notice of the assertion.

2004]

RIGHT TO CLAIM AUTHORSHIP

291

infringement the court shall, "in considering remedies, take into
account any delay in asserting the right."9 7
The CDPA's "assertion" precondition derives from a peculiar,
not to say perverse, reading of article 6 i' of the Berne
Convention. The Berne Convention declares that "the author
shall have the right to claim authorship of the work."98 From a
provision entitling authors to recognition of their status as
creators, the drafters of the CDPA fashioned an obligation to
assert authorship before the right to be recognized can take
effect. Not only does the U.K. text torture the Berne text, but the
assertion requirement may well violate the Berne Convention's
rule that "[t]he enjoyment and exercise" of authors' rights,
including moral rights, "shall not be subject to any formality."9 9
Moreover, one may inquire how the assertion requirement
affects third parties. The text of the CDPA appears to leave
significant gaps in coverage. The text holds two classes of persons
bound by an author's assertion of attributib)n rights: (1) assignees
and persons "claiming through" them, when the assignment
contained an assertion; and (2) anyone to whom notice is brought
of an "instrument in writing [containing the assertion] signed by
the author or director."' 0 The structure of the statute prompts
several questions. For example, what kind of written instrument
is contemplated, and how is notice brought to third parties? It
appears that identification of the author on the book, on the
screen credits, et cetera, does not, standing alone, satisfy the
statute, because even though this form of identification gives
general notice of who the author is, it is not an "instrument in
writing signed" by the author.1 If the publishing contract
contained the assertion, then the additional assertion printed in
the book would constitute the notice of the assertion in the
publishing contract, which in turn would be the signed written
instrument. But what if there is a printed assertion, but no
contract, or no contract containing the assertion? What if there is
a contract, but no printed assertion? These and other difficulties
(5) In an action for infringement of the right the court shall, in considering
remedies, take into account any delay in asserting the right.
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, ch. 48, § 78 (U.K.).
97.
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, ch. 48, § 78(5) (U.K.).
98.
Berne Convention, supra note 6, art. 6'(l).
99.
Id. art. 5(2). For a critical analysis of the CDPA, see Shelia J. McCartney, Moral
Rights Under the United Kingdom's Copyright, Designs and PatentsAct of 1988, 15 COLUM.VLA J.L. & ARTS 205 (1991).
100.
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, ch. 48, § 78 (UK.).
101.
Accord 493 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th Ser.) (1988) 1302. Lord Beaverbrook stated that
"[tihe presence of a name on a book is no indication of a claim [of authorship, within the
meaning of the statute]." Id.; see also 491 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th Ser.) (1987) 362.
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(notably, the anomalies respecting the Berne Convention) counsel
against adopting the British assertion requirement.
c. Transfer and Waiver of Right. The CDPA attribution
right is not assignable and passes on death either to the persons
°2
to whom copyright is passed or by testamentary disposition.
But the Act also includes a broad waiver provision. Moral rights
may be waived by an instrument in writing that is signed by the
person giving up the right. Unlike the Australian copyright act
which, as we will see, requires considerable specificity for
effective waiver of attribution rights in nonemployee works, in
the United Kingdom a waiver of attribution rights may relate to
a specific work, but also more broadly to works of a specified
description, or more broadly still, to works in general. The waiver
may relate to existing or future works and it may be conditional
or unconditional or subject to revocation.' 3 In addition, the same
result may be achieved by an informal waiver or any other
transaction having effect under the law of contract or estoppel.'
2. Canada. Statutory recognition of attribution rights in
Canada dates back to the 1931 Copyright Act, whose text
5 though some
followed article 6 b' of the Berne Convention,
earlier judicial decisions already "echoed the philosophy of moral
on attribution rights were, like
rights."'0 6 The current provisions
7
the U.K. law, enacted in 1988.
Beneficiaries. The 1988 Canadian text confers the moral
right of attribution of authorship on authors irrespective of
copyright ownership. Although the Act's distinction between
moral rights and copyright ownership suggests that both
a.

Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, ch. 48, § 95(1) (U.K.).
102.
Id. § 87(1)-(3).
103.
Id. § 87(4).
104.
Compare Copyright Amendment Act, S.C., ch. 8, § 12(7) (1931) (Can.), with
105.
Berne Convention, supra note 6, art. 6"".
Ysolde Gendreau & David Vaver, Canada,in 1 INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW
106.
AND PRACTICE, supra note 91, § 7 (citing Joubert v. G-racimo, [1916] 35 D.L.R. 683, 694
("stigmatizing the failure to credit dramatist as author and changing the title of work as
'intolerable frauds,' suggesting that punitive damages could be awarded, and stating 'an
author is entitled to have his work credited and his text respected, and also to have the
material benefit that may flow from the reputation of his name or the popularity of his
works'")).
Dissatisfaction with the old provisions (under which actions asserting moral
107.
rights generally failed) led to the enactment of new provisions in 1988. See, e.g., David
Vaver, Author's Moral Rights in Canada, 14 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L.
329, 354 (1983). The one exception was a case in which an artist had Christmas wreaths
removed from the necks of geese he had sculpted for a department store. Snow v. Eaton
Centre Ltd., [1982] 70 C.P.R (2d) 105 (Ont. H.C.J.).
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employee and independent authors enjoy moral rights, the Act
does not define "author." °8 The subject matter of coverage
excludes performances, sound recordings, and broadcasts because
they are not deemed "works," and therefore are not considered to
have "authors."10 9
b. Scope of the Attribution Right. The author has the right
to be known as the creator of her own work, either by her own
name or under a pseudonym. This right is limited by two
conditions. First, it may be asserted only in connection with an
act subject to economic rights under copyright, that is, when
reproduction, publication, or performance occurs."0 Second, the
right may be given effect only to the extent that its exercise is
"reasonable" in the circumstances or usages. By contrast, the
right to remain anonymous is not subject to any criterion of
reasonableness."' However, when the author is an employee or a
ghostwriter, the appropriateness of the author's claim to name
credit is to be determined on a case-by-case basis, and is linked to
the possibility of waiving moral rights."2
The caselaw suggests that courts use the reasonableness
standard and the waiver provision (which allows for implied
waiver) to dismiss claims of infringement of the right of
attribution."3 Even where an act cannot be claimed as reasonable
However, one case in which the issue of authorship was raised held that the
108.
subject of a photograph could not claim moral rights infringement because he was not the
author of the photograph. Ethier v. Boutique A Coiffer Tonic Inc., [1999] R.R.A. 100 (Que.
Super. Ct.).
Ysolde Gendreau & David Vaver, Canada,in 1 INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW
109.
AND PRACTICE, supra note 91, § 7(1). Performers' rights, as enumerated in Part II of the
Copyright Act, do not explicitly include the right of attribution, but the exception for fair
dealing in the case of criticism or review or news reporting only applies if the source and
the name of the author, performer, maker or broadcaster are mentioned. See Copyright
Act, R.S.C., ch. C-42, §§ 29.1-.2 (1985) (Can.).
Copyright Act, R.S.C., ch. C-42, § 14.1(1) (1985) (Can.). But cf Desputeaux v.
110.
Editions Chouette (1987) Inc., [2001] R.J.Q. 945 (Que. C.A.) (leave for appeal to the
Supreme Court of Canada granted on November 8, 2001) (precluding arbitrator from
determining the authorship of a work because it would implicate moral rights), rev'd,
[2003] S.C.J. 15.
Copyright Act, R.S.C., ch. C-42, § 14.1(1) (1985) (Can.). "The author of a work
111.
in connection with an act mentioned in section 3, the right, where reasonable in
has ....
the circumstances, to be associated with the work as its author by name or under a
pseudonym and the right to remain anonymous." Id.
Ysolde Gendreau & David Vaver, Canada,in 1 INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW
112.
AND PRACTICE, supra note 91, § 7(1)(b) (citing Tat-ha v. Centre Hospitalier de
L'Universit6 Laval, [1999] A.Q. 181 (Que. S.C.)) (discussing a hospital employee who had
prepared a report that was modified before publication under the name of other people
and who was unsuccessful in her attempt to claim coauthorship because the practice was
deemed reasonable and the circumstances probably amounted to an implied waiver of her
rights).
Id.
113.
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(such as a clear case of plagiarism or omission of an author's
name), the court may dismiss the case if the plaintiff cannot
show any loss from the violation.1
c. Transfer and Waiver of Right. Attribution rights
"subsist for the same term as the copyright in the work" at issue,
and they pass with the copyright if bequeathed, or as other
property passes in the absence of a will. " 5 Attribution rights
"may not be assigned but may be waived in whole or in part."'' 6
Waivers or consents to particular acts need not be in writing and
may be either express or implied. However, "assignment of
copyright in a work does not by that act alone constitute a waiver
of any moral rights.""' On the other hand, once a waiver is
established in favor of the copyright owner or licensee, it runs in
favor of persons authorized by them unless the language of the
waiver otherwise indicates."8
3. Australia. Australia enacted moral rights amendments
to its copyright law in 2000, following more than ten years of
study and discussion. "9 Of the countries examined here,
Australia's law appears to be both the most highly elaborated
and the most balanced in its approach to the interests of creators
and exploiters.
a. Beneficiaries. Under the Copyright Amendment (Moral
Rights) Act of 2000 (the "Australian Act"), the "author of a work
has a right of attribution of authorship in respect of the work.""'
"[T]he author of a work may be identified by any reasonable form
of identification" so long as the identification is "clear and
114.
See Boudreau v. Lin, [1997] 75 C.P.R (3d) 1, 14 (Ont.) (dismissing as speculative
a student's claim that he had lost employment opportunities through his professor's
failure to name him as the author of a paper); Desmarais v. Editions Fides, [1999] J.E. 991424 (Que.) (dismissing an action by a photographer's estate after a publisher, who had
neglected to mention the photographer's name to identify him as the author of the cover
photograph, included such a mention in the second printing of the book).
115.
Copyright Act, R.S.C., ch. C-42, § 14.2(1)-(2) (1985) (Can.).
116.
Id. § 14.1(2).
117.
Id. § 14.1(3).
118.
Id. § 14.1(4).
119.
See Discussion Paper, ProposedMoral Rights Legislation for Copyright Creators
(1994), available at http://austlii.edu.au/au/other/media.OLD/1081.html; Copyright Law
Review Committee, Report on Moral Rights (Jan. 1988), available at http://www.ag.gov
.au/www/rwpattach.nsf/viewasattachmentPersonal/E12E15ED9F963E4CCA256B4100092
DA9/$file/Moral%20Rights%20Table.pdf. See generally MAREE SAINSBURY, MORAL RIGHTS
AND THEIR APPLICATION IN AUSTRALIA 31-67 (2003).

120.
Copyright Amendment (Moral Rights) Act 2000 § 193(1) (Austl.) (amending
Copyright Act 1968); see also Brad Sherman & James Lahore, Australia, in 1
INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 91, § 7(1)(a).
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reasonably prominent."'' If the author "has made known, either
generally or to a person who is required ...to identify the
author, that the author wishes to be identified in a particular
way" that is "reasonable in the circumstances[,] the identification
is to be made in that way.' ' 122 The Act does not define "author,"
although it adopts the general presumption that the person
named as the author on publicly distributed copies is the work's
author.12 The Act does limit the "author" designation to
individuals
(thus excluding corporations and other juridical
124
persons).
The Berne Convention also presumes that the author is the
person who the divulged copies say is the author,1 2' but the
overall context there, as elsewhere in the Australian Act, is
economic rights. In the context of attribution rights, the
presumption does nothing for the author who complains that her
name did not appear on the copies of the work. An approach like
the U.K. statute's, defining the "author" as the "creator" of the
work, 126 appears more helpful, although this may merely defer
the inquiry to the undefined term "creator."'27
The Act distinguishes beneficiaries of the attribution right
from owners of economic rights. Employees may not be copyright
owners, 28 but they are vested with moral rights (although, as we
shall see, their rights are easily relinquished). Even where, under
Australian law, the subject matter is not classed a "work," as is
the case with a "cinematograph film," the Act confers the
attribution right on the "maker" of the film, defined as "the
director of the film, the producer of the film and the screenwriter
of the film."'29
b. Scope of the Attribution Right. The right of attribution
applies to "attributable acts."'2 0 The definition of these acts
121.
Copyright Amendment (Moral Rights) Act 2000 §§ 195(1)-195AA (Austl.).
"[R]easonably prominent identification" is defined in Section 195AB.
122.
Id. § 195(2).
123.
Id. § 127(1). This is subject to section 35, which sets forth circumstances under
which an employer will be considered the author of an employee's work. Special rules also
apply for ascertaining authorship of a photograph. See id. § 127(3).
124.
Id. § 190.
125.
Berne Convention, supra note 6, art. 15(1).
126.
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, ch. 48, § 9(1) (U.K.).
127.
See Jane C. Ginsburg, The Concept of Authorship in Comparative Copyright
Law, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 1063, 1069-71 (2003).
128.
See Copyright Amendment (Moral Rights) Act 2000 § 35(6) (Austl.) (amending
Copyright Act 1968) (stating that the employer is owner of the copyright in works created
by the employee pursuant to employment).
129.
Id. § 189.
130.
See id. § 193(2).
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depends on the type of work at issue.' The author of a literary,
dramatic, or musical work may invoke the right of attribution
where the work is reproduced in material form, published,
performed in public, transmitted, or adapted.'3 2 The author of an
artistic work has the right to be identified as the author where
the work is reproduced in material form, published, exhibited to
the public, or transmitted.'3 3 The designated creators of a film
have the right to be named
where the film is copied, exhibited in
34
transmitted.
or
public,
The right of attribution is subject to the limitations of
reasonableness, necessity, and other conditions indicated by the
2000 statute. For example, the right is not infringed if it was
"reasonable in all the circumstances not to identify the author."'35
The factors the Act enumerates to consider in determining
reasonable nonattribution of authorship for literary, dramatic,
musical, or artistic works 36 differ slightly from those for film
131.
Id. "The author's right is the right to be identified in accordance with this
Division as the author of the work if any of the acts (the attributable acts) mentioned in
section 194 are done in respect of the work." Id.
132.
Id. § 194(1).
133.
Id. § 194(2).
134.
Id. § 194(3). The Act also expanded the duty to the author of a work to refrain
from certain acts of misattributing authorship of that work. See id. § 195AC. The right
precludes inserting or affixing another person's name in or on the work or film, or in or on
a reproduction of the work or film, in such a way as to imply falsely that another person is
its author. Id. §§ 195AD(a), 195AE(a). In relation to "artistic" works specifically, the right
also precludes authorizing the use of a person's name in connection with the work or with
a reproduction of the Work. Id. § 195AE(2). This right generally precludes the
dissemination of the work or film, or any reproduction of the work or film, to the public in
a way that implies falsely that another person is the author, if the offender "knows that
the person is not the author of the work." Id. The acts that constitute dissemination in
violation of this right vary according to the type of work or film at issue. Section
195AD(b)-(d) deals with literary, dramatic, or musical works; section 195AE(2)(b)-(d)
deals with artistic works; section 195AF(2)(b)-(c) deals with films.
For literary, dramatic, or musical works and for films, the Act specifies a duty to
refrain from knowingly performing the work in public as another author's. See id.
§§ 195AD, 195AF. The right also applies to adaptations or alterations of literary,
dramatic, or musical works or films, and precludes disseminating to the public, by any of
the specified modes, any substantially altered form of the work or film if the offender
knows that it has been changed. See id. §§ 195AG, 195AH. This right does not apply to
artistic works.
135.
Id. § 195AR(1).
136.
See id. § 195AR(2)(a)-(i). This section reads as follows:
(a) the nature of the work;
(b) the purpose for which the work is used;
(c) the manner in which the work is used;
(d) the context in which the work is used;
(e) any practice, in the industry in which the work is used, that is relevant to
the work or the use of the work;
(f) any practice contained in a voluntary code of practice, in the industry in
which the work is used, that is relevant to the work or the use of that work;
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works.13 7 In all cases, however, the factors take account of
industry practice and give courts considerable discretion in their
assessment of reasonableness.
c. Transfer and Waiver of Right. The duration of the
attribution right is coterminous with the other rights under
copyright (life plus fifty years). 38 Although an author's moral
rights can be exercised postmortem by her legal personal
representative, the rights are not transferable by assignment or
by will.139 Where there is more than one author of a film or a work
as included in a film, the Act gives effect to any coauthorship
agreement requiring that the rights be exercised jointly. 4 ° With
respect to all other works, the Act also gives effect to
coauthorship agreements bearing on the attribution right. 4'
Waiver of moral rights is permissible under the Act, and
consent of the author-or a person representing the author-is a
defense to any infringement action. The act or omission must be
"within the scope of a written consent [genuinely] given by the

(g) any difficulty or expense that would have been incurred as a result of
identifying the author;
(h) whether the work was made:
(i) in the course of the author's employment; or
(ii) under a contract for the performance by the author of services for
another person;
(i) if the work has 2 or more authors-their views about the failure to identify
them.
Id.
See id. § 195AR(3)(a)-i). This statute lists the following factors to consider
137.
when determining "whether it was reasonable in particular circumstances not to identify
the maker of a cinematographic film":
(a) the nature of the film;
(b) whether the primary purpose for which the film was made was for
exhibition at cinemas, for broadcasting by television or for some other purpose;
(c) the purpose for which the film is used;
(d) the manner in which the film is used;
(e) the context in which the film is used;
(f) any practice, in the industry in which the film is used, that is relevant to
the film or the use of the film;
(g) any practice contained in a voluntary code of practice, in the industry in
which the film is used, that is relevant to the film or the use of the film;
Ch) any difficulty or expense that would have been incurred as a result of
identifying the maker;
Ci) whether the film was made in the course of the employment of the director,
producer or screenwriter.
Id.
Id. §§ 33, 195AM().
138.
Id. § 195AN(1)-(3).
139.
Id. § 195AN(4).
140.
Id. § 195AN(5).
141.
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author., 4 2 Consent to be effective must be given "in relation to all
or any acts or omissions" and "in relation to a specified work or
specified works existing when the consent is given."' The
requirement of specific consent is, however, dramatically relaxed
in the case of employee creations: "[C]onsent may be given by an
employee for the benefit of his or her employer in relation to all
or any acts or omissions ... and in relation to all works made or
to be made by the employee in the course of his or her
' For
employment."144
all works, whether or not employee-created,
a properly executed consent is presumed to extend to all licensees
45
and successors in title.
4. The Worst and Best of the Commonwealth Acts. The
previous discussion has already underscored some of the
weaknesses of the Commonwealth acts, most glaringly the
United Kingdom's "assertion" requirement. The U.K. and
Canadian provisions on waiver would similarly seem to offer
authors little effective protection, as boilerplate renunciations,
even with respect to future works, are enforceable and need not
even be in writing. Waiver provisions of some kind are probably
consistent with article 6bi" of the Berne Convention. Although
Berne specifies the independence of moral rights from economic
rights and further emphasizes that moral rights persist "even
after the transfer of the said [economic] rights,"'4 6 article 6b does
not clearly prohibit the waiver of moral rights. 47 On the other
hand, the independence and persistence of moral and economic
rights under Berne also implies that a grant of economic rights
does not of itself entail a waiver of moral rights. Rather, respect
for the independence of moral rights suggests that any waiver, to
be effective, must be stated with sufficient specificity to
distinguish the moral rights waiver from affirmative transfers of
economic interests. I believe the U.K. and Canadian provisions
do not meet this standard. By contrast, the Australian Act offers
a better model because it gives exploiters the opportunity to
contract out of attribution rights in writing in specific contexts,
but (apart from employee works) bars the blunderbuss approach.

142.
Id. § 195AW(1).
143.
See id. § 195AW(2)-(3). See section 195AW for "Author's consent to act or
omission" for films or works in films and section 195AWA for "Author's consent to act or
omission" for works not included in a film.
144.
Id. § 195AWA(4); see also § 195AW(4).
145.
Id. §§ 195AW(5), 195AWA(5).
146.
Berne Convention, supra note 6, art. 6 b".
147.
See, e.g., SAM RICKETSON, THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF
LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS: 1886-1986, at 467 (1987).
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With respect to infringement, the countries surveyed also
link violation of the attribution right to violation of an economic
right under copyright; this means that acts of reproduction,
public performance, et cetera which are excused as "fair dealing"
or are otherwise noninfringing, do not trigger the attribution
right. On the other hand, in certain instances, the "fair dealing"
criteria set out in the Australian, Canadian, and U.K. acts
already require that the copied source be credited. In other
instances, however, particularly regarding audiovisual works and
sound recordings, a work may be copied for permissible purposes,
but the author may not ensure that her name will appear on
those copies. "8
The United Kingdom and Canada provide an open-ended,
undefined reasonableness criterion for enforcement of attribution
rights. The burden appears to be on the author to demonstrate that
her demand for name credit is reasonable. A reasonableness
requirement may have the merit of flexibility but the concomitant
drawback of unpredictability; given authors' generally weaker
position, the latter feature may prove particularly disadvantageous.
By contrast, the Australian Act better reconciles the interests of
authors and exploiters in two ways. First, it places the burden on
the exploiter to show that the omission of credit was reasonable.
Second, the Act articulates factors cabining "reasonableness." These
not only introduce flexibility, but may also enhance predictability.
This is not a paradox; rather, the Australian Act provides an
important incentive for interested parties (or their representatives)
to anticipate and work through situations in which credit should or
should not be required. This is because the Act includes as a
reasonableness factor "any practice contained in a voluntary code of
practice, in the industry in which the work is used, that is relevant
to the work or the use of the work."149

See, e.g., Copyright Amendment (Moral Rights) Act 2000 § 42 (Austl.) (amending
148.
Copyright Act 1968) (requiring "sufficient acknowledgment" for use of literary, dramatic,
musical or artistic work for "reporting of news in a newspaper, magazine or similar
periodical" but not for "reporting of news by means of a communication or in a
cinematograph film"); Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, ch. 48, § 30(3) (U.K.)
("No acknowledgement is required in connection with the reporting of current events by
means of a sound recording, film, broadcast or cable programme."); cf. Copyright Act,
R.S.C., ch. C-42, § 29.1-.2 (1985) (Can.) (requiring for the purposes of criticism or review
and news reporting that "(a) the source; and (b) if given in the source, the name of the
(i) author, in the case of a work, (ii) performer, in the case of a performer's performance,
(iii) maker, in the case of a sound recording, or (iv) broadcaster, in the case of a
communication signal" be mentioned).
Copyright Amendment (Moral Rights) Act 2000 § 195AR(2)(f) (Austl.)
149.
(amending Copyright Act 1968).
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B. The U.S. Visual Artists Rights Act
Although VARA's coverage is too limited to supply a
meaningful source of attribution rights for most authors, the way
in which the Act implements the stingy rights it does grant is
worth examination. VARA entitles authors "to claim authorship
of [their] work[s]." 150 It does not require "assertion" or other
formality to make the right enforceable.
Under VARA, attribution (and integrity) rights are not
transferable, but they are waivable."' Happily, VARA does not
allow co-contractants to shake off authors' rights restraints by
means of a blanket, boilerplate waiver. Rather, VARA protects
artists by permitting waiver only if the author expressly agrees
to such waiver in a written instrument signed by the author.
That "instrument shall specifically identify the work, and uses of
that work, to which the waiver applies, and the waiver shall
apply only to the work and uses so identified."'5 2 This language
makes clear that an "all my right, title, and interest" sort of
waiver would be void. The law thus denotes sensitivity to the
specificity of moral rights, while introducing a degree of
flexibility toward art object owners and/or copyright exploiters
permissible under Berne. Arguably, the best recognition of moral
rights would countenance no waivers. This position, however, is
probably too extreme for the United States, and Berne does not
require it. As a practical matter, moreover, despite their formal
prohibition, de facto waivers are likely to occur. The artist may
be better protected under a regime requiring specificity of
waivers than under one where an ideologically pure "no waiver"
law is in fact rarely observed.
Moreover, under VARA, the burden of securing a waiver
falls on the party other than the artist. If the art object's owner,
or the grantee of the copyright in the artwork, fails to obtain a
writing from the artist executing the waiver, then the artist
retains all moral rights. It is up to the other party to secure the
artist's written agreement to change the initial allocation of
moral rights. Absent this legislation, most of an artist's moral
rights protections could be obtained, at the artist's initiative, only
by contract. Because many artists may be poor negotiators, or
may conduct their business rather informally, requiring artists to
150.
17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(1)(A) (2000). VARA also entitles authors to prevent use of
their names on works they did not create, as well as to prevent use of their names on "a
distortion, mutilation, or other modification of the work which would be prejudicial to his
or her honor or reputation." Id. § 106A(a)(1)-(2).
151.
Id. § 106A(e)(1).
152.
Id.

2004]

RIGHT TO CLAIM AUTHORSHIP

301

"contract into" moral rights often as a practical matter would
deny them the exercise of moral rights. Instead, the very
informality of artwork commissions may work to artists'
advantage, for a handshake deal or a vague writing will not effect
the waiver. The law's reversal of the initial position may
therefore entail considerable favorable consequences for artists.'5 3
At the time of VARA's enactment, Congress anticipated that
the requirement of specific waivers might in the long run simply
enhance
lawyers'
and
word
processors' employment
opportunities, for lawyers could be expected to devise language
sufficiently comprehensive and detailed to fend off every
conceivable exercise of moral rights. This would defeat the
purpose of compelling artists and art owners to reflect on and
negotiate over the genuine need to forego moral rights. As a
result, Congress set an additional safeguard by instructing the
United States Copyright Office to conduct a study of the practice
developed under the law's waiver clause.' The study, published
in 1996, however, uncovered too little data regarding actual
waiver practice to permit meaningful assessment of the
frequency, content, and impact of waivers of attribution and
integrity rights under VARA."'
C. Outline of a ProposedStatute
This review of the implementation provisions of the
Commonwealth acts and of VARA suggests the following outline
for an attribution rights amendment to the U.S. Copyright Act.
1. Beneficiaries. The right's beneficiaries should be the
human (not juridical) authors and performers, regardless of their
employment status. Unlike VARA, an attribution rights
amendment should not exclude from its ambit creators of works
made for hire. Nor should the law disqualify categories of works:
all works of authorship, and all musical, dramatic, choreographic
or audiovisual performances should be covered. Similarly, the
number of a work's authors or performers should not of itself
disqualify these participants from the right to claim
authorship. 56' Although a multiplicity of authors or performers
153. However, the law also provides that one joint author's waiver of moral rights binds
all joint authors. Id.
154.
See H.R. REP. NO. 101-514, at 22 (1990), reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915,
6932.
155. See U.S. Copyright Office, Waiver of Moral Rights in Visual Artworks: Executive
Summary (Mar. 24, 1996), availableat http://www.copyright.gov/reports/exsum.html.
156. Not all participants in an extensively staffed work such as a motion picture are
authors, even though, by contractual arrangement mechanics, hairdressers, et cetera,
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might prompt fears that enforcement of an attribution right will
be too unwieldy, the implementation problems are better
addressed through an infringement standard that incorporates a
reasonableness criterion, as well as through carefully devised
waiver provisions.
2. Scope of the Attribution Right. The duration of the
attribution right would be the same as the copyright term.
Arguably, the public interest in accurate identification of a
work's creators persists beyond the expiration of exclusive
economic rights in the work. Indeed, as the earlier discussion of
Lanham Act misattribution claims regarding public domain
works indicates,"' I doubt that a healthy public domain demands
freedom not only to copy, but also to deny or to falsify authorship
credit. Nonetheless, different durational consequences flow from
the distinct nature of authors' rights on the one hand, and
consumer protection on the other. The interests underlying these
regimes may at times converge, hence authors' pre-Dastarresort
to the Lanham Act, faute de mieux. But neither fully captures the
other. By placing the attribution right in the U.S. Copyright Act,
I am contending that it is an exclusive right like the other rights
comprising a copyright-enforceable (for limited times) without
proof of economic harm or consumer confusion." 8 The unfair
competition-based Lanham Act claim does not confer a property
right in gross; it allows injured economic actors (who may not in
fact be authors) to act as proxies for the confused consumer, to
may receive name credit. See Randy Kennedy, Who Was That Food Stylist? Film Credits
Roll On, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2004, at Al. I would limit this proposal to authors and
performers. Caselaw on joint authorship may afford guidance as to what kinds of
contributions make someone an "author." See, e.g., Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227,
1235 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating that concluding who is an "author" is a fact-specific inquiry
and that "[pirogress would be retarded rather than promoted, if an author could not
consult with others and adopt their useful suggestions without sacrificing sole ownership
of the work"); Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 507-08 (2d Cir. 1991) (creating a twopart test for determining coauthorship that requires (1) "all joint authors to make
copyrightable contributions" and (2) that "the putative joint authors regarded themselves
as joint authors"); see also Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195 (2d Cir. 1998) (applying the
Childress test to find lack of coauthorship in the play Rent). Several law reviews also
address the concept of "authorship." See generally F. Jay Dougherty, Not a Spike Lee
Joint? Issues in the Authorship of Motion Pictures Under U.S. Copyright Law, 49 UCLA L.
REV. 225 (2001); Jane C. Ginsburg, The Concept of Authorship in Comparative Copyright
Law, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 1063 (2003); Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, "Author-Stories":
Narrative's Implications for Moral Rights and Copyright's JointAuthorship Doctrine, 75
S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (2001).
Refer to Part II supra.
157.
Arguably, the incentive rationale for copyright would urge that the right of
158.
attribution be perpetual, as the prospect of immortality for her name might prompt some
to create. But this would conflict with "limited Times" and is likely to prove
unadministrable in practice.
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correct the false information the defendant has injected into the
marketplace. To each regime its own: to authors, control over the
use of their names in connection with their works for so long as
economic rights last, and to consumers, protection against false
representations of fact in commercial advertising or promotion
for so long as those misrepresentations are materially
misleading. Respect for the copyright public domain counsels
against conflating the two regimes, lest the attribution right be
leveraged into control akin to that sought by Twentieth Century
Fox in Dastar.
The attribution right would be infringed when an author's or
performer's name is omitted from publicly distributed copies and
phonorecords 5 9 or from public performances, including
transmissions, of the work. 6 ° Though the statute should
distinguish between public and private distributions or
communications, with only the public ones triggering the right,
fair use and other statutory exceptions should not supply a
defense. It is important to recognize the difference between
permissible copying or communications on the one hand, and
uncredited copying or communications on the other. 6 ' This does
159.
A "phonorecord" is the material object in which a sound recording is fixed. See
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
160.
Works incorporating substantial preexisting copyrighted material, such as
derivative works, should also credit the authors of the adapted or substantially excerpted
work. The obligation to give credit would be subject to a reasonableness standard.
An amendment to the U.S. Copyright Act to establish attribution rights would
also require a transitional provision concerning the right's effective date. I would propose
that a work first publicly communicated or distributed on or after the amendment's
effective date be covered by the attribution right, regardless of when the work was
created. With respect to public communications or distributions occurring before the
amendment's effective date, the amendment should preserve such state or federal
attribution rights as may then have existed. Cf 17 U.S.C. § 301(f)(2) (preserving state
attribution and integrity claims in works created or sold prior to VARA's effective date); see
also Copyright Amendment (Moral Rights) Act 2000 § 195AZM (Austl.) (amending
Copyright Act 1968) (providing that the 2000 Moral Rights amendments are prospective
only). In relation to literary, dramatic, musical, or artistic works, other than those
included in a film, the right of attribution applies to works that were made before or after
December 21, 2000. Id. § 195AZM(2). However, the right only applies to acts carried out
after December 21, 2000. Id. In relation to films and literary, dramatic, or musical works
and works included in films, the right of attribution only applies to films made after
December 21, 2000. Id. § 195AZM(1).
161.
For example, the 'fair dealing" exception in the Australian and U.K. copyright
statutes requires "sufficient acknowledgement" of the authors of certain works. See
Copyright Amendment (Moral Rights) Act 2000 §§ 41-42, 44-45; Copyright, Designs and
Patents Act, 1988, ch. 48, § 30(1)-(2) (U.K.).
Section 107 of the U.S. Copyright Act, the fair use exception, provides that it
applies to § 106A VARA rights as well as to the economic rights in § 106, even though any
application of fair use is likely to be limited. See H.R. REP. No. 101-514, at 22 (1990),
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 6932 ("[Gliven the limited number of works covered
by the Act, and given that the modification of a single copy or limited edition of a work of
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not mean that omission of name credit can never be fair and
reasonable. Rather, the test of reasonableness in this context is
not the same as for fair use. The question is not whether the use
should be prevented or paid for, as it is when fair use is at issue,
but whether the use, even if free, should acknowledge the user's
sources. The manner and medium of the work's dissemination
may well affect the reasonableness of nondisclosure of authors' or
performers' names. For example, a requirement to identify all
authors and performers may unreasonably encumber the radio
broadcast of a song, but distributed recordings of the song might
more conveniently include the listing. This may be particularly
true of digital media, where a mouse click can provide
information even more extensive than that available on a printed
page.
As for the details of a reasonableness standard, I believe a
U.S. statute might profitably emulate the Australian Act, both in
its technique, placing on the exploiter the burden of showing
reasonableness, and in its articulation of reasonableness factors,
including its encouragement to parties to devise voluntary codes
for various sectors of creative activities. In fact, the credit
agreements negotiated between industry groups such as the
162
several motion picture and television guilds and the studios
might inspire similar codes elsewhere.
In light of the uncertain status of creators' Lanham Act false
attribution claims post-Dastar,the attribution rights amendment
to the U.S. Copyright Act should also prohibit false attributions
of authorship. These claims are analytically distinct from
traditional moral rights, which protect the author's right to claim
authorship of her works: these instead assert a right to disclaim
authorship of a work not by the author. Nonetheless, if the
Lanham Act cannot redress these claims, for example, because of
the "commercial advertising or promotion" prerequisite, 63 or
because of authors' lack of standing, then the Copyright Act
should provide a remedy. The proposed amendment would in this
respect follow the United Kingdom, New Zealand, and Australia,
whose moral rights amendments grant authors rights against
both nonattribution and false attribution.
visual art has different implications for the fair use doctrine than does an act involving a
work reproduced in potentially unlimited copies.").
162.
See, e.g., Writers Guild of America-East, "Basic Agreement," supra note 50.
163.
Lanham Act § 43(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B).
164.
See, e.g., Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, ch. 48, § 84(5)-(6);
Copyright Amendment (Moral Rights) Act 2000 §§ 195AD-195AH (Austl.) (amending
Copyright Act 1968). Refer to note 134 supra (discussing Australian false attribution
claims).
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3. Waiver. Both VARA and, to some extent, the Australian
amendments provide an appropriately narrow approach to
waivers of attribution rights. To be enforceable, the waiver
should be in writing and signed by the author or performer before
the work is created or performed, 65' and should specifically
identify the works and the kinds of uses to which the waiver
applies. As in Australia, the waiver might, unless otherwise
specified, pass on to the co-contractant's successors. On the other
hand, ambiguities in the scope of the waiver should be construed
against the party asserting the waiver (whether or not that party
is the original grantee). Unlike the Australian Act, a U.S.
attribution rights statute should not allow blanket waivers for
present and future works of employees. Employee-executed
waivers should meet the same standard as those of authors who
are vested with copyright. Because attribution rights are
independent of economic rights,166 an author should not need to
be vested with the economic rights in order to qualify as a holder
of attribution rights. With respect to works of multiple
authorship, my proposal departs from VARA, which allows one
joint author to waive all co-authors' rights.'6 7 I would provide that
a waiver is effective only as to the co-author(s) who sign the
requisitely specific writing; co-authors who do not sign would
retain their attribution rights.'66

165.
Formalization of the waiver before creation or performance may be necessary to
avoid extortion by transferees who demand the waiver in return for payment for work
done. See Schiller & Schmidt, Inc. v. Nordisco, Corp., 969 F.2d 410, 412-13 (7th Cir. 1992)
(requiring that writing that makes a commissioned work "for hire" be executed before
creation of the work).
166.
See, e.g., Berne Convention, supra note 6, art. 6b'; 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)-(b)
(stating that authors of works of visual art have attribution and integrity rights "whether
or not the author is the copyright owner").
17 U.S.C. § 106A(e)(1).
167.
The U.S. Copyright Office Study, noted above, makes a similar
168.
recommendation. WAIVER OF MORAL RIGHTS IN VISUAL ARTWORKS: FINAL REPORT OF THE
REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, Mar. 1, 1996, at xvii.
A point of relative consensus voiced in the Office's public proceedings and in
academic sources such as Nimmer on Copyright was that VARA inappropriately
permits one joint author to waive the moral rights of coauthors in a joint
work .... Congress may wish to amend the statute to provide that no joint
author may waive another's statutory moral rights without the written consent
of each joint author whose rights would be affected.
Id.; see also 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8D.06[D],
at 8D-84 to 8D-85 (2003); Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, How Fine Art Fares Post VARA, 1
MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 45 n.246 (1997) ("[Alllowing one joint author to waive the
rights under VARA for all other joint authors significantly undermines the rationale for
moral rights protection.").
There may be instances in which the public would retain an interest in knowing
who is a work's true author even if that person willingly (and specifically) waived her
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4. Remedies. Injunctive and monetary relief should be
available to redress violations of the attribution right. Although a
remedy compelling inclusion of the author's name in subsequent
public distributions or communications of the work may be the
principal form of relief, modification of existing, undistributed
inventory may also be appropriate.'6 9 Authors should be able to
claim damages based on a showing of specific harm.
Alternatively, because such a showing may be difficult to
demonstrate,"o an attribution rights amendment ought to
provide for statutory damages. As is already the case for VARA
violations, registration should not be a prerequisite to obtaining
statutory damages."'
V.

CONCLUSION

The U.S. Constitution authorizes Congress to secure for
limited times the exclusive right of authors to their writings. 72
Curiously, those rights, as enacted in our copyright laws, have
not included the right to be recognized as the author of one's
writings. Yet, the interest in being identified with one's work is
fundamental, whatever one's conception of the philosophical or
policy basis for copyright. That is, whether one sees copyright as
a personality right conferring on the author the ownership of the
fruits of her labor, or as an economic incentive scheme to promote
the production of works of authorship, or as a public works
program designed to fill the public domain (or, most accurately,
as a combination of the three), giving credit where it is due is
fully compatible with both the author-regarding and the publicattribution right. This is another reason to maintain the distinction between copyrightbased and Lanham Act-based (mis)attribution claims.
169.
Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 405(a)(2) (discussing the addition of notice to copies distributed to
the public after omission of notice is discovered); see also, e.g., Hasbro Bradley, Inc. v.
Sparkle Toys, Inc., 780 F.2d 189, 197 (2d Cir. 1985) (discussing the application of
§ 405(a)(2)'s notice requirement).
170.
See, e.g., Johnson v. Jones, 149 F.3d 494 (6th Cir. 1998). Architect Johnson sued
another architect, Jones, who had copied Johnson's plans but put his own name on them.
Id. at 499. The court of appeals held that Johnson was entitled to recover Jones's gross
revenue from the reverse passing off, and that Johnson's "actual damage claims were
'wholly speculative,'" and thus not recoverable. Id. at 507; see also Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc.,
978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that evidence supported a damage award claim of
$200,000 for voice misappropriation under California law for the "shock, anger, and
embarrassment" of a performer whose voice was imitated in a radio commercial jingle).
For damage awards under VARA, see Martin v. City of Indianapolis, 192 F.3d 608 (7th
Cir. 1999). In Martin, the City of Indianapolis intentionally destroyed a work of art by
Martin, who sued under VARA. Id. at 610-11. The court of appeals upheld the trial
court's award of $20,000 in statutory damages, the maximum amount allowed for a
nonwillful VARA violation. See id. at 610, 614.
171.
See 17 U.S.C. § 412 (citing § 106A(a)).
172.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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regarding aspects of these goals. But, after Dastar,the state of
U.S. authors' and performers' entitlement to obtain name credit
for their contributions, doubtful before, has been rendered the
more precarious. While once authors could seek the partial cover
of a "patchwork" of protections,173 of which the Lanham Act
furnished the strongest cloth, currently they are left in doctrinal
tatters. With even the fig leaf of Berne Convention compliance
now substantially stripped away (to wear out the sartorial
metaphor), it is time to do the right thing and amend the
Copyright Act to provide explicitly for attribution rights. This
Article proposes the framework and content of such a statute.

See H.R. REP. No. 100-609, at 37 (1988); Final Report on U.S. Adherence, supra
173.
note 8, at 39.

